GOLIAD

No. 6 of 7

A Handbook of Texas, Southwestern Historical Quarterly, and Texas Almanac Companion.

INDEPENDENCE! ROAD TO THE TEXAS REVOLUTION HISTORY SERIES.
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With appreciation for the past and hope for the future,

Jesús F. de la Teja  
CEO  
Texas State Historical Association

Walter L. Buenger  
Chief Historian  
Texas State Historical Association

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The Goliad Campaign of 1836, a campaign of the Texas Revolution, was a victorious operation for the Mexican army under Gen. José de Urrea. Though the defeat of Texas forces led to the execution of James W. Fannin's command in the Goliad Massacre, the campaign helped inspire ultimate victory over the Mexicans at the battle of San Jacinto.

The Texans had available a considerable number of men to deploy against the advancing Mexican army in early 1836. Some were regular troops; most were in the volunteer force (see REVOLUTIONARY ARMY). Colonel Fannin landed at Copano on February 2, 1836, with about 200 men—the four companies of the Georgia Battalion and the two small companies of captains Burr H. Duval and Luis Guerra, the latter the commander of a Mexican artillery company that had joined José Antonio Mexía at Tampico but left him at Velasco (see MEXÍA'S EXPEDITION). Six small companies, amounting to another 200, awaited Fannin at Refugio; sixty more volunteers
were at San Patricio under Francis W. Johnson and James Grant. Another eighty, including Capt. John (Jack) Shackelford's company of Red Rovers, were encamped on the Lavaca River awaiting Fannin's call. Two strong companies, 100 men, recruited by Capt. Amasa Turner, were at the mouth of the Brazos under orders to report to Fannin at Copano; and Edwin Morehouse's New York Battalion had, on January 20, renewed its voyage to Texas from Nassau. This force, 190 strong, had sailed from New York on November 21, 1835, on the brig Mattawamkeag but had been detained for two months in the Bahamas on charges of piracy. Francis W. Thornton, with a small company of regulars, occupied the old presidio of Nuestra Señora de Loreto at Goliad; and James C. Neill had 150 men at San Antonio to defend the Alamo and the town of Bexar. Still, these diverse groups did not constitute a large army; but because of the scarcity of means of land transportation in Texas, they would have been, once assembled on the frontier, as large a force as Texas resources could have supplied.

Fannin went to Copano as agent of the provisional government to organize a Matamoros expedition (see MATAMOROS EXPEDITION OF 1835–36)-designed to aid Mexican Federalists against the Centralists led by Antonio López de Santa Anna—after Francis W. Johnson declined the offer following a disagreement with the General Council's provisions. With Sam Houston on self-assigned furlough, a move designed to check the dissent generated against him for his opposition to the Matamoros campaign, Fannin was the senior Texas officer in the field. On February 4 and 5 he marched the companies he had with him at Copano to the Texan camp at Refugio as a step toward the proposed
Matamoros campaign, only to learn, on February 7 through Plácido Benavides, that Santa Anna's threatened movement to overwhelm Texas and suppress the rebellion was already under way. Benavides, a Mexican revolutionary from De León's colony, obtained information from the alcalde of Matamoros, warning that Bexar and Goliad were to be attacked simultaneously and that a trap awaited the Texans at Matamoros, where the Mexican army was gathering. Fannin dispatched William G. Cooke with two companies to reinforce San Patricio and removed his own headquarters to Goliad (La Bahía), leaving Amon B. King with his small garrison at Refugio and John Chenoweth with a few mounted men to guard Copano, the crucial port for Refugio, Goliad, and San Antonio. After Fannin successfully removed to Goliad, Shackelford joined him there with the Lavaca elements on February 12. Fannin ultimately reorganized his Goliad command into a single regiment consisting of the Georgia Battalion and the Lafayette Battalion.
Meantime, disaster had struck at the mouth of the Brazos. The schooner *Tamaulipas*, carrying Turner's two companies and the Texas army's whole supply of munitions, clothing, and shoes—badly needed by Fannin's volunteers—was wrecked on February 5 on the Brazos sand bar. Turner and his men were now employed in salvaging the cargo. Fannin learned at the same time that New Orleans underwriters had refused to insure Texas-bound cargoes consigned via Aransas Pass, thereby effectively terminating all plans for using Copano as a base. Provisions, arms, and munitions now had to be consigned via *Cavallo Pass* and the Matagorda ports and hauled overland from there.

Withdrawal to Goliad was Fannin's own idea, and it proved to be a tragic mistake. He gave as his reason for fortifying Goliad his "conviction of its importance, as being advantageously located for a depot of reinforcements, clothing, provisions and military stores. It commands the sea coast, particularly Aransas and Matagorda Bays, and consequently the only convenient landings for vessels of any tonnage." *Martín Perfecto de Cos* had landed at Copano in 1835 and had expected to draw his supplies through that port. The Texan capture of Goliad in October 1835 intervened between Copano and Cos and starved him into capitulation (*see GOLIAD CAMPAIGN OF 1836 and BEXAR, SIEGE OF*). Fannin, trained at the United States Military Academy at West Point, well knew that the Texan occupation of Goliad had contributed more to Cos's defeat than had Texan prowess in the siege of Bexar. Santa Anna knew this, too. In readying his advance, he declined reliance on Copano unless and until that port had been made safe by the weight of his advance. He collected "1800 pack mules, 33
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four-wheeled wagons, and 200 two-wheeled carts" for the overland haul from the Rio Grande, means of transport that the Texans could not match. For the Texas cause, Goliad could remain important only as long as Texans held Bexar, and it is questionable how effectively Fannin could "command" Aransas Bay with a small number of infantry some forty miles away. The village of Guadalupe Victoria (now the city of Victoria) offered a more defensible and friendly place from which to command Matagorda Bay—where the supplies were—but Goliad offered better housing and was a shorter distance from Refugio, where Fannin's command had been stationed without tents and little shelter.

When Fannin withdrew to Goliad on February 12, Santa Anna's force was already on the march, with light cavalry and local Mexican rancheros, particularly from the Refugio and Goliad areas, serving as advance forces gathering intelligence. Fannin wrote as early as February 7 that "It is useless to controvert the fact that our true strength and geographical situation are well known to Santa Anna." By contrast, Fannin had no mounted troops to use for scouting the Mexican advance, and remained generally ignorant of their movements. Santa Anna's main body, 6,000 effectives (exclusive of new recruits, muleteers, teamsters, and other auxiliaries) was moving through Laredo and San Juan Bautista Presidio against Bexar. The army's only hindrance was want of forage, especially between the Nueces and the Medina rivers, where the Texans and the Indians had burned the grass. Santa Anna's advance column encamped on the Medina on February 20 and before Bexar on February 23. His right wing, more than 1,000 strong, was commanded by General Urrea, an energetic officer. It had concentrated at Matamoros late in January and waited there, collecting provisions and reinforcements, until Urrea began his march toward San Patricio on February 13, en route ultimately to Goliad, Victoria, and Brazoria, to command access to the Gulf of Mexico.

General José de Urrea
Urrea's first objective was the raiding party under Johnson and Grant. On February 9 Cooke, at San Patricio, told Fannin of the departure of Johnson and Grant with their sixty men on a foray into Tamaulipas. They had declined service under Fannin but had left behind in Cooke's charge their three cannons and a quantity of ammunition. Fannin dispatched Duval with teams and carts to take this artillery and ammunition and ordered Cooke to return with them to Goliad, where Cooke arrived about February 19. At this juncture William B. Travis, now sharing a divided command at Bexar, sent James Butler Bonham, Fannin's long-time friend, to confer with the "Acting Commander-in-Chief" at Goliad. A council on February 19, in which Bonham represented Travis, caused Fannin to toy with the idea of moving his headquarters to Bexar or reinforcing the garrison there, but nothing was done. Fannin continued at Goliad, keeping his men busy rebuilding the old presidio, which he renamed Fort Defiance.

This work was still unfinished when Travis's call for help reached Goliad on February 25. Fannin planned to leave the next day with 320 volunteers and four pieces of artillery to join Travis, calling in Chenoweth's mounted men from Copano to hold the Cibolo crossing and Captain King's company from Refugio to strengthen the Goliad garrison, now left under Ira Westover. Fannin's march to relieve Travis at Bexar, however, ended on the banks of the San Antonio River only two miles from Fort Defiance. Wagons broke down, oxen strayed, provisions were scarce, and the anxious volunteers all insisted on going along; only Westover's regulars agreed to stay at Goliad. Fannin's men lacked shoes and clothing—many were barefooted and nearly naked—and faced a well-provisioned and trained enemy of superior numbers; Fannin's aide-de-camp, John Sowers.
Brooks, wrote, "we can not rationally anticipate any other result to our Quixotic expedition than total defeat."

After the futile river-crossing Fannin decided that since the movement toward Bexar would expose supplies and provisions accumulating at the Matagorda ports some sixty miles away, it would be better to return to Goliad and continue fortifying the old presidio. But he declined to fall back to where the provisions were located, even though his command seriously needed them. Fannin realized the need as early as February 28. But the provisional government, not perceiving the actual field situation, had ordered him to make no retrograde movements but to await reinforcements at Goliad, and would not give him the authority to retreat; and Fannin, who was becoming increasingly doubtful of his ability to command, awaited orders. The two-day attempt to relieve Bexar cost him precious time and popularity and caused bitter resentment among many of his men, especially the New Orleans Greys. Of all of this the Goliad commander was quite aware.
Fannin also incurred ill feelings through his involvement in the quarrel within the provisional government between the council and Governor Henry Smith over the Matamoros expedition, an involvement that also strained his relationship with his second in command, William Ward.

Meanwhile, Johnson and Grant were still determined to carry out an expedition to Matamoros, and General Urrea was eager to subdue them. Johnson, with thirty-four men and a hundred fresh horses, had returned to San Patricio on February 26. The command had encamped in five separate parties, two of about seven men each guarding the horses and the others in three widely separated houses in different parts of the town. The night was "very raw and excessively cold," with continuous rain. Taking advantage of the adverse weather, General Urrea surprised the Texans at three o'clock the following morning, and all were killed or captured except Johnson and four others who escaped (see SAN PATRICIO, BATTLE OF). Leaving a detachment to occupy San Patricio, Urrea then backtracked to find Grant, whose party he surprised on March 2 at Agua Dulce Creek. Dr. Grant and thirteen of his men were killed, six were captured, and only six escaped, including Plácido Benavides, who reported the event to Fannin at Goliad (see AGUA DULCE CREEK, BATTLE OF).

With Travis under siege at the Alamo (see ALAMO, BATTLE OF) and Copano rendered useless by Urrea's advance, Fannin's small force could serve no good purpose by continuing at Goliad, as Fannin well knew. He wrote acting governor James W. Robinson on February 22, "I learn from several sources, that as soon as Bexar is retaken, they next march here, and thus complete their chain of communication to the Interior and Gulf. I am resolved to await your orders, let the consequence be what it may. But I say to you, candidly . . . that unless the people of Texas, forthwith, turn out in mass . . . those now in the field will be sacrificed . . . and if we are not to be sustained in a proper
manner, and in good time, receive orders to fall back to the Provisions, and on the Colonies, and let us all go together. I have orders from you not to make a retrograde movement, but to await orders and reinforcements. If a large force gets here, and in possession of the provisions and stores of Matagorda Bay, being all now in Texas, it will be a desperate game for us all."

Robinson's order "not to make a retrograde movement" was coupled with orders "to hold your position at Copano, and if possible, at San Patricio." Fannin had attempted neither, wanting to maintain an option in the event of an attack by a superior force. He sought only to pass on to higher authority the responsibility for an order he knew would be unpopular with his men, who, having labored resentfully to fortify the old Goliad presidio, were now eager to confront the Mexicans and determined to test their labors, not retreat. Thus, rebuilding the fort immobilized the force and compelled it to a defense.

Fannin imagined that his letter of February 7 to Robinson, advising him of Benavides's warning about the imminence of Santa Anna's incursion, had aroused Texas colonists and that they would hurry to Goliad as they had hurried to Gonzales in 1835; but it was Travis's ringing calls from the Alamo, and not Fannin's letter, that brought colonists into the field in 1836. Indeed, by late February Fannin had lost confidence in the Texas colonists; their refusal to reinforce his army angered him. Frustrating him further, the members of the Convention of 1836 had no appreciation of danger and took no measures to meet the coming emergency. The convention supposed as late as March 5 that Fannin had united with Travis, that other reinforcements had joined them, and that the Alamo was safe.

Picketing, ditching, and mounting cannons for the defense of Fort Defiance were completed about March 1, and Fannin thought the fort ready to stand a siege. Ammunition was not too plentiful; provisions were dangerously scarce. These were now abundant at Cox's Point and Dimitt's Landing on Matagorda Bay, and Fannin exerted himself to have them hauled to the fort. The wagons sent for provisions, however, did not return until March 10 and 11.
Fannin might have held the line of the Guadalupe River if that had been his object. Amasa Turner's two companies had salvaged the Tamaulipas but were still at the mouth of the Brazos, kept there by local influences that thought only of the defense of local ports. The Mattawamkeag, with Morehouse's New York Battalion, waited for convoy in the Mississippi from February 12 until March 3, when it sailed for Matagorda Bay; it touched at the mouth of the Brazos en route. The William and Francis, with William P. Miller and seventy-five recruits for the Legion of Texas Cavalry, sailed from the mouth of the Mississippi on March 5 under John M. Allen, who had recruited a company of regulars in New Orleans, intended to sail on the Equity at about the same time.

Both Miller and Allen were acting under orders issued by General Houston in December 1835, which were, in effect, that they should recruit their respective companies as soon as practicable and report with them to Copano. Disregarding the turn of events since these orders were issued, both officers insisted on literal compliance and refused to take passage for Matagorda Bay. Most of Allen's men refused to embark at Copano. On March 5 the Mattawamkeag arrived off the mouth of the Brazos and from there sailed for Cavallo Pass, where it fell in with the Texan schooner Liberty and her prize, the Pelicano. The Mattawamkeag and the Liberty crossed the dangerous bar, but the Pelicano was lost inside the pass. The New York Battalion was then diverted to salvaging her cargo rather than landing at Cox's Point to reinforce Fannin as originally ordered. Meanwhile, acting governor Robinson wrote Fannin on March 6 to "use your own discretion to remain where you are or to retreat as you may think best for the safety of the brave Volunteers Under your command."
Despite Houston's warning in January against sending out small parties when the Mexican army was so near, Fannin had sent out at least two: one on March 10 under William C. Francis of Shackelford's company to Carlos de la Garza's ranch, a suspected "nest of spies"; and King's party sent to Refugio. King's mission was particularly shortsighted on Fannin's part, since King was sent directly into Urrea's known path with enough men to attract attention but too few to repel attack by the Mexican army. A better choice might have been to send Hugh McDonald Frazer and the Refugio militia, since they would have been aiding evacuation of their fellow colonists. Regardless, historians generally agree that sending King to Refugio was the initial significant misjudgment that ended in catastrophe for Fannin's command.

Fannin's march to join Neill awaited King's return. On March 12 King, while collecting the scattered families, decided to punish some local rancheros who had been plundering Refugio, and in so doing blundered upon one of Urrea's advance cavalry outposts at Esteban López's lower ranch (the site of modern Bonnie...
View). King managed to gather the scattered families and, pursued by a Mexican force of about fifty or sixty men, retreated with the families into Nuestra Señora del Refugio Mission, from where he sent word to Fannin for help.

Fannin received King's plea at 1:00 A.M. on March 13 and ordered William Ward and the Georgia Battalion and a portion of Peyton S. Wyatt's company to King's relief. Ward, Fannin's second in command, was wholly inexperienced like most of the Goliad garrison, so Fannin then sent John Sowers Brooks and Joseph M. Chadwick to ensure Ward's success; but their guides got lost in the dark and their force returned to Goliad. Fannin's orders to Ward, like his aborted march on February 25 to relieve Travis and his orders to King, were basically issued on impulse, without any real consideration of the military problems involved. Sending Ward's detachment to Refugio meant placing one-third of the Goliad garrison-more men than Travis had had in the Alamo—without provisions, transport, or reserve ammunition, and without proper support, directly in the path of Urrea's advancing main army.

Ward left Goliad at 3:00 A.M. on March 13, force-marched twenty-seven miles across rain-soaked prairie, and relieved the besieged King at about three that afternoon. After this initial skirmish Ward decided to rest his men overnight before returning to Fort Defiance. Meanwhile, Santa Anna was sending Urrea reinforcements from Bexar-Col. Juan Morales's Jiménez and San Luis battalions—and Urrea was en route to Refugio, having been informed of Ward's movements through such scouts as Carlos de la Garza's rancheros. Expecting Texan reinforcements to land at Copano—William P. Miller's volunteers were then en route aboard the William and Francis—Urrea initially mistook Ward's maneuver for an occupation of that port. Therefore, upon being advised that the Georgia Battalion stopped at Refugio, the Mexican general sent Capt. Rafael Pretalia's cavalry unit along with Guadalupe de los Santos's local rancheros to hold Ward there until the main Mexican army could arrive. Urrea marched from the Aransas River at midnight with 180 infantry, 100 cavalry, and an artillery piece, leaving the rest of the army, under Col. Francisco Garay, to follow. Had
Ward shown equal energy, and had he and King not disagreed, they might have been at Goliad at dawn the following day.

Instead of returning to Goliad, however, Ward and his men, like King's, were eager for a fight, and they found one early the next day, March 14. King refused to return to Goliad with Ward until he had punished the rancheros on López's lower ranch. His party of twenty-eight men ambushed and killed eight local Mexicans, assumed to be spies, sitting around a campfire; indeed, one of them had been in Luis Guerra's Mexican company, formerly of Fannin's command, and was found with communications to Urrea written while he had been at Fort Defiance. Meanwhile, Ward sent a force under his second in command, Warren J. Mitchell, on a reconnoitering mission. As Urrea's army of some 1,500 men approached, Mitchell's detachment returned to the mission.

Suffering heavy losses conservatively estimated at 100 dead and fifty wounded, excluding ranchero casualties, Urrea launched several vigorous assaults on Ward's position, all of which the Texans repulsed with minor casualties. King's detachment, returning in mid-afternoon on the western margin of the Mission River, stumbled upon the rear of Urrea's army and was at once attacked. King took position in a wood on the bank of the river and resisted all efforts by Col. Gabriel Núñez's cavalry and Colonel Garay's infantry to dislodge him, valiantly inflicting punishing losses on his assailants until darkness ended the fight.

Having exhausted most of their ammunition and provisions, both King and Ward tried to escape. Captured dispatches led Urrea to suppose that the Texans would retreat toward Goliad, but Ward marched out on the Copano road and so escaped. King crossed the Mission River where it was not considered fordable, wetting his little remaining gunpowder; when overtaken the next day by Carlos de la Garza's rancheros, he was unable to resist. He and his men were returned to the old mission. In obedience to the Mexican decree of December 30, 1835, which commanded death to all armed rebels, most of King's men were shot on March 16. Col. Juan José Holsinger of the Mexican army spared and liberated
Ward and his command retreated in the riverbottom swamps toward Guadalupe Victoria, where Ward logically assumed Fannin now would be, since the Goliad commander had ordered him to rendezvous there in the event that his retreat to Goliad was cut off (see REFUGIO, BATTLE OF). Urrea left his wounded and a detachment at the Refugio mission under command of Col. Rafael de la Vara, eight of the men, including Refugio colonists Lewis T. Ayers, Francis Dieterich, and Benjamin Odlum.
charged also with guarding Copano, then dispatched cavalry units and local rancheros after Ward's men and proceeded with about 900 effectives toward Goliad.

Meanwhile, on March 11, General Houston arrived at Gonzales and learned that the Alamo had fallen on March 6. He hurried Capt. Francis J. Dusanque to Goliad with these tidings and ordered Fannin to fall back to Guadalupe Victoria "as soon as practicable . . . with your command, and such artillery as can be brought with expedition. The remainder will be sunk in the river." Houston further ordered Fannin to blow up Fort Defiance, defend and help evacuate Victoria, and forward one-third of his effective force to Gonzales.

Fannin received this order either on March 13 or 14; the day is a matter of considerable historical dispute, since he has been charged with disobeying Houston's command by dispatching Ward to Refugio, then remaining at Goliad awaiting Ward's return. Houston's order to retreat "as soon as practicable" gave Fannin some discretion, however. The more significant question is not why Fannin lingered after March 14, but why he had dallied after February 25, when he learned that Santa Anna was at Bexar. Regardless, Houston himself expressed little confidence in Fannin in his letter to James Collinsworth of March 13: "I would not rely on any co-operation from him. . . . The projected expedition to Matamoras, under the agency of the council has already cost us 237 lives; and where the effects are to end, none can foresee. . . . I fear La Bahia (Goliad) is in siege."

Ironically for Fannin, he now had his long-awaited order to retreat but had neither the means to perform it effectively nor an accounting of his dispatched personnel. Nearly all his carts and teams were with King at Refugio, and only a few hours earlier Ward had marched to King's relief. A small company of Texans under Capt. Sam A. White was at Guadalupe Victoria, assembling carts and teams primarily gathered from among the residents by the alcalde of Victoria and quartermaster of the army John J. Linn. By so doing, Linn deprived his own citizens of a means of escape, but he directed them to Cox's
Point. Although Guadalupe Victoria was the principal town in De León's colony and primarily a Mexican village, the De León family, including José M. J. Carbajal, Silvestre and **Fernando De León**, and Benavides, together with most of their colonists, supported the cause against Santa Anna and were legitimately concerned about their treatment by Urrea's approaching Mexican army.

A swift retreat to Victoria was in Fannin's best interest not only because the Guadalupe River made for a more defensible line and the citizens of Victoria, unlike those of Goliad, were friendly; but the village afforded some provisions, and needed reinforcements were already there or nearby. In addition to White's company **Albert C. Horton** was also near Victoria with more than forty men, many of them mounted. **Philip Dimmitt**, the former Goliad commander, recruited a company of twenty-one men there as well, though Houston called them to Gonzales; and Morehouse's New York Battalion was reorganizing on Matagorda Bay.

Turner's two companies were still at the mouth of the Brazos, though Robinson had ordered them to Bexar. Miller and his men, heading for Copano, were, unknown to Fannin, somewhere off Aransas Pass.

On March 14, while Ward and King were fighting the battle of Refugio, Fannin dispatched successive couriers to them and to Horton and White at Victoria. The expert rancheros of Carlos de la Garza and others captured all of these couriers, whose messages supplied Urrea with exact knowledge of Fannin's situation, strength, and intentions. Fannin, having no mounted men and watched on all sides by Mexican cavalry and rancheros, was virtually blind.
Horton and thirty-one mounted men, escorting the teams and carts from Victoria, joined Fannin late on March 14. These were the last reinforcements the Goliad commander received; the garrison now totaled some 330 men, excluding King's and Ward's commands and various unattached supernumeraries. Prudence dictated that Fannin retreat quickly to Victoria. This was what Ward expected him to do, and having first eluded Urrea at Refugio by marching toward Copano, Ward left the Copano road at Melon Creek and marched across country toward Victoria, where he believed Fannin would be. Colonel Fannin, however, spent March 15 and 16 "in vain anticipation of Ward's return," though he did plan for the retreat by selecting nine pieces of artillery to take with him and burying seven others. At 4:00 P.M. on March 17 he learned of King and Ward's fate through Hugh McDonald Frazer of the Refugio militia, who had volunteered to investigate.

Instead of retreating hastily to Victoria, Fannin spent March 18 taking "the necessary measures for a retreat in accordance with the resolution of the officers in council last evening." He and his men had no intention of making a hurried retreat, nor any apparent concern for their situation. The men were still ready for a fight, and most, including their commander, little esteemed the prowess of their enemy. Urrea, knowing Fannin's intentions, dispatched cavalry units and rancheros to hold the Texans at Goliad, as he had done with Ward at Refugio; and, expecting daily Morales's battalions from San Antonio, was bringing up the remainder of his army to lay siege to Fort Defiance. Morales and his 500 men occupied their assigned position on Manahuilla Creek about three miles north of Goliad on March 17; Urrea reached the San Antonio River the same day and joined Morales the next. The Mexican army now totaled at least 1,400 men, excluding the 200 rancheros.

Horton had discovered Morales's battalions during a scouting mission on March 17, at which time a council among Fannin and his officers determined to retreat the next morning. At that time Urrea's advance cavalry appeared, and Horton, sent to chase them, tired his horses. Fannin, thinking these advance units were the whole of Urrea's army, assumed Fort Defiance would soon be put under siege.
and so kept the garrison on alert, ordered the buried cannons dug up and remounted, and the village of La Bahía burned. The oxen, sole means of removing artillery, supplies, munitions, and baggage, were left standing unfed in the corrals. No retreat was attempted even that night, a delay based on Horton's seeing Mexican troops at the San Antonio River crossing and his concern that the night was too dark to keep to the road.

The retreat, started at midmorning during a heavy fog on March 19, was late and much confused. Provisions so painfully accumulated were burned; rations for the march were not saved; the unearthed cannons were spiked. Fannin still insisted on bringing nine brass cannons and 500 spare muskets. The carts were heavily loaded, the hungry oxen unruly. Precious time was lost as a cart broke down; the largest artillery piece fell into the San Antonio River and required an hour's labor to retrieve. Even so, the retreat might have been accomplished had Fannin listened to the urgings of Duval, Westover, and Shackelford and pushed his march to the shelter of the woods bordering Coleto Creek. Instead, Fannin halted the column to rest the men and graze the hungry oxen on the broad prairie between Manahuilla and Coleto creeks, thus losing another precious hour. Had this halt been made in the Coleto woods, water, forage for the teams, a defensible position, and superior marksmanship would have multiplied Texan strength.

Fannin and many of his men, contemptuous of Mexican military abilities, did not believe the enemy would follow them. Urrea, skillfully stalking his foe, mistook Fannin's unexplained delay for an intention to stand and fight at Goliad and was not immediately prepared to intercept him; thus he allowed the Texans
Surrounded on the prairie, without food and without water, Fannin's inexperienced command fought the seasoned veterans with whom Urrea had encircled them throughout the long and bloody afternoon of March 19. The
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Taxans suffered ten deaths and sixty or more wounded; Urrea lost considerably more, perhaps some fifty killed and 140 wounded, but reports vary widely. Fannin's men, unwilling to leave their wounded, chose not to escape under cover of darkness as they might otherwise have done. They were aroused on the following morning by fire of Urrea's artillery, which had arrived with Mexican reinforcements overnight. The Texan commander was convinced of the futility of continuing the fight and the necessity of seeking surrender terms, especially since his men were huddled helplessly in improvised trenches, were without food, and had no water for the wounded. By order of el presidente, Santa Anna, and by congressional decree, however, Urrea could offer no terms other than unconditional surrender (see COLETO, BATTLE OF).

Horton and about thirty mounted men had gone forward to hold the Coleto crossing before the fighting began on March 19. They were not included in the capitulation, having escaped after attempting to break through Mexican lines; they returned to the edge of the timber and eventually retreated to Victoria. Horton could see no useful purpose in adding his men to the general sacrifice. His comrades did expect that he would bring reinforcements the next morning, but finding Victoria virtually deserted-Dimmitt, Linn, and White had since departed-Horton continued on to Gonzales, though he made no attempt to hold that place and await Ward's men, who were thought to be retreating from Refugio.

Ward, having fed and rested his men at Fagan's ranch on March 18, headed for Victoria via the Guadalupe timber. On the nineteenth he heard the sound of Fannin's battle at the Coleto, an estimated ten miles distant, and after losing valuable time trying to join Fannin there, returned to the Guadalupe river bottom.
that night. Urrea, knowing that Fannin expected reinforcements and that Ward planned to rejoin his commander at Victoria, already had dispatched the rancheros of Carlos de la Garza and others who knew the land well to prevent Ward from joining Fannin and to pick up stragglers. After Fannin's surrender on March 20, Urrea pressed toward Victoria, where he skirmished with some of Ward's men trying to enter the town. Ward, with the remnants of the Georgia Battalion dispirited, footsore, hungry, and without ammunition, again retreated into the Guadalupe woods. There a number of his men left him, and ten of them eventually escaped.

At 10 P.M. on March 21 Ward aroused his remaining men and sought to march by night to Dimitt's Landing. After halting on March 22 within two miles of that place to kill a beef for food, he was surrounded by Urrea's cavalry and forced to surrender on the terms accorded Fannin. Except for those who escaped en route from Refugio and those Urrea detained in Victoria as laborers
to build boats, which would enable the Mexican army to cross the swollen Guadalupe River and continue toward Brazoria, Ward and the rest of his command, about eighty-five men, were marched back to Goliad and imprisoned with Fannin's men.

Despite Urrea's rather reserved plea to Santa Anna to treat Fannin's command as prisoners of war, the Mexican president determined to carry out the decree of December 30, 1835; and, doubting Urrea's resolution to execute so many prisoners, sent the order directly to Col. José Nicolás de la Portilla, whom Urrea had left in charge of Goliad. Portilla carried out the order and executed Fannin's command, including Ward's battalion-more than 400 men-on Palm Sunday, March 27, 1836, in the event known as the Goliad Massacre. Fannin's Goliad campaign had reached its tragic end.

The reinforcements Fannin's men so anxiously hoped for were either grouping near Gonzales awaiting Houston's orders or arrived too late to do any good. On March 19, while Fannin was fighting to the death in the battle of Coleto, Edwin Morehouse of the New York Battalion was with President David G. Burnet's new ad interim government at Groce's Retreat on the Brazos, seeking his commission as major of this command. The battalion took no part in any major engagement of the revolution, however. By the time William P. Miller's Nashville Battalion landed at Copano, Urrea's forces under Rafael de la Vara had occupied the port. Miller and his recruits were surprised without arms and taken prisoner without resistance about March 22. Though also imprisoned at Goliad, they were separated from Fannin's men and spared. These men, along with others spared as laborers, physicians, orderlies, and carpenters, were later marched as prisoners to Matamoros, escorted by the retreating Mexican army following Houston's victorious battle of San Jacinto. Many escaped on the way, and most were later freed by the Mexican government.
For General Urrea, the Goliad Campaign of 1836 was the most significant victory in a series of successful operations against the Texans to secure the gulf region from San Patricio to Brazoria. Indeed, "so great was the reputation he had established during the campaign," wrote a fellow officer, that "he was looked upon as an anchor of salvation." After taking possession of Guadalupe Victoria on March 21, he captured and occupied the various ports along the coast, fording rivers swollen from excessive rains. Matagorda was taken on April 13, Columbia on April 21, and Brazoria the following day. Urrea started for Velasco and Galveston on April 23, when he received orders from Gen. Vicente Filisola to retreat as a consequence of Santa Anna's defeat at San Jacinto. Despite Urrea's adamant insistence that "the high spirit of my division" be utilized to reinforce his comrade and triumphantly counterattack Houston, he was reassigned to the reserve units by his superiors. The victor of the Goliad campaign of 1836 then bitterly backtracked to Matamoros.
James Walker Fannin, Jr., Texas revolutionary, was probably born on January 1, 1804, in Georgia, the son of Dr. Isham Fannin. He was adopted by his maternal grandfather, James W. Walker, and brought up on a plantation near Marion. He entered the United States Military Academy at West Point on July 1, 1819, under the name James F. Walker, but withdrew in November 1821. He returned to Georgia and several years later married Minerva Fort, with whom he had two daughters. In the autumn of 1834 he and his family moved to Texas and settled at Velasco, where he supposedly was a plantation owner. His letters affirm the fact that he was a slave trader.

Fannin became an agitator for the Texas Revolution and on August 20, 1835, was appointed by the Committee of Safety and Correspondence of Columbia to use his influence for the calling of the Consultation. On August 27 he wrote to a United States Army officer in Georgia requesting financial aid for the Texas cause and West Point officers to command the Texas army. In September Fannin became active in the volunteer army and subscribed money to an expedition to capture the Veracruzana, a Mexican ship at Copano; but the expedition did not materialize, and Fannin went to Gonzales, where, as captain of the Brazos
Guards, he participated in the **battle of Gonzales** on October 2, 1835. On October 6 he was one of a committee urging **Stephen F. Austin** to bring all possible aid to Gonzales, and when Austin brought up the whole Texas army and moved toward Bexar, **James Bowie** and Fannin were sent as scouts to determine conditions between Gonzales and Bexar and to secure supplies. On October 27 Bowie and Fannin selected a campsite near Nuestra Señora de la Purísima Concepción de Acuña Mission and on October 28 led the Texas forces in the **battle of Concepción**.
On November 10 Fannin was ordered to cut a Mexican supply route between Laredo and San Antonio but returned to headquarters when he was not joined by a supporting force. On November 13 Sam Houston, commander in chief of the regular army, offered Fannin the position of inspector general, but Fannin received an honorable discharge from the volunteer army on November 22 and began an urgent campaign for a larger regular army. On December 5 the General Council, acting on Fannin's advice, established an auxiliary volunteer corps. Houston commissioned Fannin as a colonel in the regular army on December 7, and on December 10 the council ordered him to enlist reinforcements for the army and to contract for war supplies in the campaign against Bexar. Bexar had surrendered on December 9, so the accumulated supplies were used in the 1836 campaign.

Continuing as an agent of the provisional government, Fannin, on January 9, 1836, began recruiting volunteers for the Matamoros expedition. After Houston withdrew from the expedition, Fannin was elected colonel of the Provisional Regiment of Volunteers at Goliad on February 7 and from February 12 to March 12 acted as commander in chief of the army. When he learned that the Mexicans under José de Urrea had occupied Matamoros, Fannin went no further with plans for the expedition and fell back to strengthen defenses at Goliad. Other elements of the expedition, under James Grant and Francis W. Johnson, were destroyed by Urrea, who then proceeded to attack Goliad. On March 12 Fannin dispatched most of his force to aid Texans near Refugio. On March 14 he received Houston's order to retreat to Victoria, which rescinded a previous order to relieve the Alamo. Waiting for the forces under Amon B. King and William Ward to return from Refugio, Fannin delayed retreating until he heard of their capture. On March 19 he began his retreat, but he and his men were surrounded and forced to surrender at the battle of Coleto. The Texans were imprisoned by the Mexicans at Goliad and subsequently murdered by order of Antonio López de Santa Anna on March 27, 1836. Fannin, because he was wounded, was shot separately at the mission on the same day.
In the months leading up to the Goliad Massacre, Fannin had shown defects as a commander. Accustomed to the discipline of a regular army, he adapted poorly to his situation as head of volunteers. He scorned the idea of electing officers and was disturbed by the lack of a clearly established hierarchy among his forces. His arrogance and ambition earned him the contempt of many of the men under his command. One private, J. G. Ferguson, wrote in a letter to his brother: "I am sorry to say that the majority of the soldiers don't like [Fannin]. For what cause I don't know whether it is because they think he has not the interest of the country at heart or that he wishes to become great without taking the proper steps to attain greatness." In his final weeks, Fannin wrote repeatedly asking to be relieved of his command. Most historians now agree that Fannin made many serious mistakes as a commander. But despite his reluctance to carry on and his sometimes poor military judgment, he held out bravely until the end. Fannin County was named in his honor, as were the town of Fannin in Goliad County and Camp Fannin, a United States Army installation. See also GOLIAD CAMPAIGN OF 1835, GOLIAD CAMPAIGN OF 1836.
Antonio López de Santa Anna Pérez de Lebrón, soldier and five-time president of Mexico, was born at Jalapa, Vera Cruz, on February 21, 1794, the son of Antonio López de Santa Anna and Manuela Pérez de Lebrón. His family belonged to the criollo middle class, and his father served at one time as a subdelegate for the Spanish province of Vera Cruz. After a limited schooling the young Santa Anna worked for a merchant of Vera Cruz. In June 1810 he was appointed a cadet in the Fijo de Vera Cruz infantry regiment under the command of Joaquín de Arredondo. He spent the next five years battling insurgents and policing the Indian tribes of the Provincias Internas. Like most criollo officers in the Royalist army, he remained loyal to Spain for a number of years and fought against the movement for Mexican independence. He received his first wound, an Indian arrow in his left arm or hand, in 1811. In 1813 he served in Texas against the Gutiérrez-Magee expedition, and at the battle of Medina he was cited for bravery. In the aftermath of the rebellion the young officer witnessed Arredondo's fierce counterinsurgency policy of mass executions, and historians have speculated that Santa Anna modeled his policy and conduct in the Texas Revolution on his experience under Arredondo. He once again served under
Arrendondo against the filibustering expedition of Francisco Xavier Mina in 1817. The young officer spent the next several years in building Indian villages and in occasional campaigns, while he acquired debts, some property, and promotions. In 1820 he was promoted to brevet captain, and he became a brevet lieutenant colonel the following year. In March of 1821 he made the first of the dramatic shifts of allegiance that characterized his military and political career by joining the rebel forces under Agustín de Iturbide in the middle of a campaign against them. He campaigned for Iturbide for a time and was promoted to brigadier general. In December 1822 Santa Anna broke with Iturbide over a series of personal grievances, and he called for a republic in his Plan of Casa Mata in December 1822.

After serving as military governor of Yucatán, Santa Anna retired to civil life and became governor of Vera Cruz. In 1829 he defeated the Spanish invasion at Tampico and emerged from the campaign as a national hero. In the course of this campaign, he demonstrated several of his characteristic military strengths and weaknesses; he was able to pull an army together quickly and with severely limited resources, but he also combined elaborate planning with slipshod and faulty execution. He rebelled against the administration three years later and was elected president of Mexico as a liberal in 1833, but in 1834 he stated that Mexico was not ready for democracy and emerged as an autocratic Centralist. When the liberals of Zacatecas defied his authority and an attempt to reduce their militia in 1835, Santa Anna moved to crush them and followed up his battlefield victory with a harsh campaign of repression. In December 1835 he arrived at San Luis Potosí to organize an army to crush the rebellion in Texas. In 1836 he marched north with
At the beginning of the Mexican War, Santa Anna entered into negotiations with President James K. Polk. He offered the possibility of a negotiated settlement to the United States and was permitted to enter Mexico through the American blockade. Once in the country he rallied resistance to the foreign invaders. As commanding officer in the northern campaign he lost the battle of Buena Vista in February 1847, returned to Mexico City, reorganized the demoralized government, and turned east to be defeated by Winfield S. Scott's forces at Cerro Gordo. Secret negotiations with Scott failed, and when Mexico City was captured, Santa Anna retired to exile. In 1853 he was recalled by the Centralists, but again power turned his head. To help meet expenses he sold the Mesilla Valley to the United States as the Gadsden Purchase and was overthrown and banished by the liberals in 1855.

For eleven years he schemed to return to Mexico, conniving with the French and with Maximilian. After a visit from the American secretary of state, W. H. Seward, he invested most of his property in a vessel that he sailed to New York to become the nucleus of a planned invading force from the United States.
Disappointed in his efforts, he proceeded towards Mexico, was arrested on the coast, and returned to exile. From 1867 to 1874 he lived in Cuba, the Dominican Republic, and Nassau. During this time he finally abandoned politics and wrote his memoirs. In 1874 he was allowed to return to Mexico City, where he lived in obscurity until his death on June 21, 1876. He was buried at Tepeyac Cemetery, near Guadalupe Hidalgo. Santa Anna was married twice, to Inés García in 1825, and, a few months after the death of his first wife in 1844, to María Dolores de Tosta, who survived him.
José Antonio Mexía, Mexican military officer, the son of Pedro Mexía and Juana Josefa Hernández was, by his own account, born in 1800 in Jalapa, although contemporary Mexican historians alleged that he was a native of Cuba. The deaths of his father and brother in the Mexican war of independence forced him to seek refuge in the United States, where he acquired such proficiency in the English language that in November 1822 Texas governor José Félix Trespalacios named him interpreter for a Cherokee Indian delegation to Mexico City. In 1823 and 1824 he served as secretary of the state congress of Tamaulipas, and from 1825 to 1827 as collector of customs in Tuxpan. In 1825–27 he took an active part in the growth of York Rite Masonry, and, after 1827, in the affairs of the Federalist party. After serving briefly as a captain in the army in 1823, he again entered active service in 1827, when he was named to the staff of Gen. Vicente Guerrero. Thereafter he received several promotions—to lieutenant colonel in 1828, to colonel in 1829, and to brigadier general in 1832.

Mexía served in the United States as secretary of the Mexican legation from November 1829 to March 1831. While in the United States he became an agent and lobbyist for the Galveston Bay and Texas Land Company. As a supporter
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of **Antonio López de Santa Anna** during the popular disturbances of 1832 in Mexico he led liberal army in its capture of Matamoros. After the **Anahuac Disturbances** in June 1832, he led the so-called **Mexía's expedition** to Texas to suppress what was thought to be the beginnings of a rebellion. **Stephen F. Austin** and other Texas leaders convinced him that the settlers were loyal to Mexico. While a senator from the state of Mexico in 1834, Mexía joined Federalist forces that rose in protest against Santa Anna's assumption of dictatorial powers.

After a two-month campaign, Mexía surrendered in the state of Jalisco and was ordered into exile by Santa Anna. In New Orleans he devoted most of the next year to organizing and outfitting a volunteer force of some 160 men (most of whom were from the United States), who sailed under his command in the **Tampico expedition** of November 1835. With the survivors of this abortive attack on Tampico he landed in Texas in December. After failing to win the support of Texas leaders for his proposal to attack Matamoros, he returned to New Orleans. During his final three years in exile, Mexía traveled to Cuba and Central America for the New Orleans export-import company of which he was a partner. He was involved also in negotiating an agreement for the construction of a Nicaraguan canal.

Tempted to return to Mexico by the resurgence of the Federalists late in 1838, he landed in Tampico on January 3, 1839, and joined Gen. **José de Urrea** as second in command. Four months later, on May 3, 1839, at Acajete, near Puebla, Urrea's undermanned forces were routed by government troops. Mexía was captured and executed by a firing squad on the same day on orders of Santa Anna. In the eyes of his countrymen he had been guilty of unpardonable treason in bringing foreign adventurers into the country.

In Mexico City on August 5, 1823, Mexía married Charlotte Walker, the twenty-two-year-old, English-born daughter of Christopher and Elizabeth (Cove) Walker. Charlotte died of typhus in Mexico City on September 25, 1864. Two of the children of this marriage were closely associated with the development of
northeastern Texas during the last half of the nineteenth century. The first of these, María Adelaida Matilda, was born at Tuxpan on August 27, 1826. By April 8, 1848, she had married **George Louis Hammeken**, an American of Danish extraction who was involved in the building of a Mexican railroad in the 1850s. Adelaida died in Mexico City on December 22, 1878. The second of the children, **Enrique Guillermo Antonio Mexía**, was born in Mexico City in January 1829. After a career in the Mexican military, he managed his and his sister's vast estates near the site of present Mexia, Texas. He died in Mexico City on September 19, 1896. In November 1833 the state of **Coahuila and Texas** granted Mexía's daughter Adelaida and his son Enrique separate titles to eleven-league tracts of land in Limestone, Freestone, and Anderson counties. In 1871 the Houston and Texas Central Townsite Company named the town of Mexia for Enrique and the Mexia family, thus perpetuating the Mexía name in Texas geography as well as Texas history.
José de Urrea, military officer, was born in 1797 in the presidio of Tucson, Sonora (now Arizona). He was a military cadet in the presidial company of San Rafael Buenavista in 1809 and a lieutenant in 1816, participating in battles in Jalisco and Michoacán. In 1821 he supported the Plan of Iguala of Agustín de Iturbide. He participated in the anti-Iturbide Plan of Casa Mata and the siege of San Juan de Uluá. Affiliated with the Plan of Montaño, Urrea was separated from army service, but in 1829 he reentered and fought in Tampico with Antonio López de Santa Anna against Isidro Barradas. He intervened in the Plan of Jalapa against the government of Vicente Ramón Guerrero and when Anastasio Bustamante came to power (1829–30), Urrea was named to the secretariat of the command in Durango. He was made a lieutenant colonel in 1831. In July 1832, along with Santa Anna, he declared for Gómez Pedraza, and in 1834 he assumed the command of the permanent regiment of Cuautla, near Cuernavaca, after having received the rank of colonel from Francisco Ellorriaga, whom he had supported. As acting general in July 1835, he was sent to fight the Comanches in Durango, where he was commandant general and then governor in September and October. He participated in the expedition to Texas in 1836 and was engaged in the battles at San Patricio, Agua Dulce Creek, and Coleto. Urrea was opposed to the withdrawal of Mexican troops ordered by the captive Santa Anna after the battle of San Jacinto. In 1837 he was named commandant
general of the departments of Sinaloa and Sonora. In December, upon being passed over for the appointment of governor, he proclaimed the two departments under the federal system, whereupon he was designated constitutional governor and protector. He then turned over his executive office to the vice governor and marched on opposing forces at Mazatlán, where he was defeated. He fled to Guaymas and finally to Durango, where he became involved in yet another uprising. In 1839 he was captured and sent to Perote Prison. Later during an imprisonment in Durango he was rescued by his partisans to take part in a revolt. In 1842 he assumed the executive power of Sonora, which he held until May 1844. In 1846 he fought against the United States in the Mexican War. He died in 1849.
Francis (Frank) White Johnson, leader in the Texas Revolution and historian, son of Henson and Jane Johnson, was born near Leesburg, Virginia, on October 3, 1799. His family moved in 1812 to Tennessee, where he was educated as a surveyor, but he rejected a government surveying position in what is now Alabama to pursue vocations in Illinois and Missouri, where he taught school, ran a grocery, operated a lumber mill, was a constable, organized a local militia, worked in a lead mine, and occasionally surveyed.

In 1826 he carried a cargo of produce down the Mississippi and became ill with malaria. On advice of a doctor he and his cousin, Wiley B. White, sailed from New Orleans to Texas for his health on the schooner Augusta. He traveled extensively in several Texas colonies, including the colony of Green DeWitt, and became well known almost immediately. That year he laid out the town of Harrisburg, and Stephen F. Austin sent him and two others to Nacogdoches to try to prevent the Fredonian Rebellion. Johnson was employed as a surveyor in the Ayish District in 1829. On January 1, 1831, he became alcalde at San Felipe de Austin, where he was part of a close-knit group of Austin supporters that included Samuel May Williams, Robert M. Williamson, Luke Lesassier, and Dr. Robert Peebles. In 1832 he was surveyor-general of Austin's colony.
The hot-tempered Johnson was considered a "firebrand" in favor of war with Mexico; in 1835 he was indicted for treason but was never arrested.

Johnson was captain of his company at the battle of Anahuac in 1832 (see **ANAHUAC DISTURBANCES**). At the **Convention of 1832** he was a delegate from San Felipe and served as chairman of the Central Standing Committee of the state. In early 1835, while in Monclova to observe the state legislature in session (see **COAHUILA AND TEXAS**), he, Peebles, and Williams were named empresarios for several hundred leagues of land to be granted to settlers in return for a year of military service from each grantee, a condition that was never carried out. After 1837 most of the grants were voided, and Johnson and the others were denounced for involvement in this land scandal.

In 1835 Johnson and **Moseley Baker** were sent to East Texas to appraise the political feelings of colonists and to stir up support for the war cause. Johnson was appointed adjutant and inspector general under Stephen F. Austin and **Edward Burleson**. At the **siege of Bexar** he led a column of Texans into San Antonio, and after **Benjamin R. Milam**'s death he was in command at the Mexicans' capitulation.

In January 1836 Johnson and Dr. **James Grant** started to lay plans to invade Mexico at Matamoros, despite opposition from **Sam Houston** and **Governor Henry Smith**, who were powerless to intervene because the **General Council** had already ratified the plan. Johnson and a detachment of fifty men were surprised by the Mexicans under **José de Urrea** at San Patricio on February 27, 1836, and all except Johnson and four of his companions were killed or captured. Hearing of Houston's retreat, Johnson returned home, quitting the revolution in disgust.

After Texas independence he settled at Johnson's Bluff, on the Trinity River in what is now San Jacinto County. There he was a planter until 1839, when he fled from his family, Texas, and creditors. His wife had been recorded in Austin's register of families as an abandoned woman named Rozelia (also Rozella or Rosalie) Hammer when she and a son named Nicholas came to Austin's colony.
from Louisiana in 1830. She and Johnson had two daughters. By 1842 she had divorced him, and in 1846 she remarried.

Johnson traveled throughout the United States, attempted to sell Texas lands, explored for precious metals in the West, and tried digging for buried treasure on Galveston Island, all unsuccessfully. He returned to Johnson's Bluff in 1847 and reclaimed his former wife; her new husband, Ralph McGee, subsequently divorced her. She remained with Johnson until her death in August 1850. In 1853 Johnson moved to Ellis County to run a livestock operation. He returned to the East in 1860 to try again to sell Texas lands; by 1861 he had arrived penniless in Indianapolis, Indiana, where he remained through the Civil War.

By 1871 he had returned to Texas, where he spent most of his declining years in Austin and Round Rock. During that period he was considered a recluse with few close friends, although he had prestige and respect. From 1873 to the end of his life he was founding president of the Texas Veterans Association. He spent much time researching Texas history, particularly the Texas Revolution. The project was financed by subscribers headed up by Gov. E. M. Pease. On his last research trip, Johnson was ill; he had already lost part of his right hand to cancer when he died in a hotel in Aguascalientes, Mexico, about April 8, 1884. It took several years for the Texas Veterans Association to get legislative financing for the return of his remains to Texas, where he received a state funeral and was buried in the State Cemetery. Johnson's manuscripts were left to several literary executors, including Alexander W. Terrell. In 1912 Eugene C. Barker, assisted by Ernest W. Winkler, used Terrell's materials and other documents as a basis for Frank Johnson's A History of Texas and Texans, published in 1914 and again in 1916.
Amon Butler King (sometimes mistakenly called Aaron B. King), to whom Col. James W. Fannin, Jr., entrusted the disastrous evacuation of Refugio during the Goliad Campaign of 1836, was born in Baltimore, Maryland, in 1807, the son of John and Mary Ann (Butler) King. After his father's death, his mother married Dr. Joseph Camp. King left home in 1827 to deal in furs; by 1833 he had become town marshal of Paducah, Kentucky. He was serving in that capacity in late October 1835, when Capt. Peyton S. Wyatt's Huntsville (Alabama) Company stopped off at Paducah en route to join the Texas Revolution. King and about eighteen other Paducans enlisted. Either before leaving Paducah or while on the way to Texas he decided to organize his own company. He detached himself and some eighteen men from Wyatt's company to form the Paducah Volunteers, of which he was captain.

The King and Wyatt companies traveled to Texas together, arriving at Nacogdoches on December 8, 1835. They marched on to Washington-on-the-Brazos and reported to Gen. Sam Houston on December 25. As a result of disagreements over the Matamoros expedition of 1835–36, King and his company were sent to Refugio the first week in January 1836 to garrison the old Nuestra Señora del Refugio Mission, where they remained until ordered to Goliad. In Goliad on March 1 they were mustered as "auxiliary volunteers" in Fannin's command at Fort Defiance.

After Francis W. Johnson's defeat in the battle of San Patricio and King's removal to Goliad, most Refugio-area families fled their homes; but some remained stranded and asked Fannin for assistance, especially since the deserted
homes were being plundered by Karankawa and Mexican marauders. On March 10 Fannin ordered King back to Refugio to extricate these stranded families and bring back supplies. At nine o'clock on March 11 King set out with twenty-eight or thirty men and the garrison's carts and teams. They arrived at Refugio late in the evening to find most of the families in the mission, though others, including the family of **Lewis T. Ayers**, were at Esteban López's ranch nearby.

The next day King proceeded to the ranch to escort Mrs. Ayers and others. They found and arrested some Mexicans, from whom King learned that the marauding bands of Mexicans and Indians plundering the countryside were encamped about eight miles below on López's lower ranch. Despite his orders to return to Goliad immediately, the former marshal marched to the lower ranch with about sixteen men to punish the marauders. His party was ambushed by Capt. **Carlos de la Garza**'s rancheros and, it is claimed, Karankawa Indians. King succeeded in getting the families back into Refugio Mission on March 12 but was surrounded and held there by Garza's men and those of Capt. Guadalupe de los Santos, who were acting as advance cavalry for Gen. **José de Urrea**'s Mexican army. Many Mexican rancheros from the San Patricio, Refugio, and Goliad areas had been incensed at their treatment by the Americans in Fannin's command and therefore remained loyal to Mexico and served as independent scouts and advance units for Urrea. The Mexican general also sent a picket of regulars under Capt. Rafael Pretalia to help Garza and Santos detain King at Refugio. King now had twenty-six men; six had become separated during the retreat. The Mexican forces probably numbered about 200, most being local rancheros.

King sent to Colonel Fannin for aid. Col. **William Ward**, with the **Georgia Battalion** and part of Wyatt's company sent to his relief, raised the siege on the afternoon of March 13 (see **REFUGIO, BATTLE OF**). King, however, refused to return to Goliad with Ward until he had first punished some rancheros who lived down the river. His insubordination was one of a number of events that led to Fannin's ultimate disaster, the **Goliad Massacre**. Apparently, both Ward's and King's men were eager to fight the Mexicans, but a
disagreement erupted between the two commanders about who should carry out the mission; King wanted the task, but Ward preferred his second in command, Warren J. Mitchell. Taking his own company and eighteen of Wyatt's men, King sallied forth on his own punitive expedition to López's lower ranch, while Ward sent Mitchell to reconnoiter the enemy and waited at the mission for their return. Meanwhile, Urrea's army approached. Mitchell saw the Mexicans and returned to the mission, which was promptly assaulted by Urrea's main body of troops.

On March 14, after ambushing and killing eight Mexicans sitting around a campfire, King found that his way back to the mission was barred by Urrea's army. The Mexicans forced him to defend himself in a motte on the south bank of the Mission River against Col. Gabriel Núñez's cavalry and Col. Francisco Garay's infantry. King and his party put up a brave fight that lasted from late morning until dark. King's arm was shattered by a musketball; one of his men was killed and four were wounded. Mexican casualties were apparently heavier, but sources are unreliable. Ayers's account, published in the Quarterly of the Texas State Historical Association (now the Southwestern Historical Quarterly) in 1906, is the only firsthand account of King's attempt to escape. During the night the Texans crossed the river, intending to make their way back to Goliad. Their powder got wet in the crossing, however, so they were defenseless. At dawn on March 15 they were at the John Malone ranch, where they were captured by Garza's men, who tied them with a single rope and marched them the eight miles back to the mission.
Although Ward was also defeated in this battle, the battle of Refugio, he managed to escape with most of his command. But he was later captured in the Victoria area and ultimately executed in the Goliad Massacre in obedience to the Mexican congressional decree of December 30, 1835. King's men, along with stragglers from Ward's command, thirty-three in number, were marched out of the mission on March 15 to be shot, again in obedience to the decree of December 30. En route to the execution site, Col. Juan José Holzinger of the Mexican army heard some of the prisoners talking in German. He stopped the execution party and returned it to the mission, where the two Germans and also six Refugio colonists, including Francis Dieterich, Benjamin D. Odlum, and Ayers, were liberated. On the next day the victims again were led out. At a spot on a draw about a mile north of the mission, Captain King and the other prisoners were shot. Their bodies were left unburied on the prairie. Sometime after the battle of San Jacinto a party of Refugio citizens headed by John Haynes gathered the bones and relics of King's men and buried them. The place of sepulture was forgotten until May 9, 1934, when a grave containing sixteen skeletons was discovered by accident in Mount Calvary Catholic Cemetery near Refugio. The bones were identified as those of King's men, and on June 17, 1934, they were reinterred in the cemetery with appropriate religious and military ceremonies. For the Texas Centennial in 1936 the state of Texas erected two memorials to King and his men-one in...
Refugio and another at Mount Calvary Cemetery. Tradition has it that another grave in the vicinity of the cemetery contains the bones of the other victims.
José Nicolás de la Portilla, a lieutenant colonel in the command of Mexican general José de Urrea during the Texas Revolution, was born in Jalapa, Vera Cruz, in 1808. After the battle of Coleto at the end of the Goliad Campaign of 1836, Portilla was placed in charge of James W. Fannin, Jr., and his men during their imprisonment at La Bahía. On March 26, 1836, Antonio López de Santa Anna, informed of Fannin's surrender and surprised that Portilla had not already carried out the law condemning as pirates "all foreigners taken with arms in their hands, making war upon the nation," ordered the Goliad commander to execute the prisoners in compliance with the national decree. With this order Santa Anna included specifications on how the executions were to be carried out. Portilla, according to his diary, kept the order a secret from all except Col. Francisco Garay, Urrea's second in command. Later in the evening of March 26 Portilla received a communication from Urrea, then at Guadalupe Victoria, directing him to "treat the prisoners with consideration, and particularly their leader, Fannin." "What a cruel contrast in these opposite instructions!" Portilla wrote in his diary. After a restless night, the Goliad commander determined that Santa Anna's orders were
superior. He isolated and spared William Parsons Miller and his men, who had been captured without arms at Copano, and formed the rest of the prisoners—more than 400—into three groups. First adjutant Agustín Alcérrica, Capt. Luis Balderas, and Capt. Antonio Ramírez then marched them out of the fort at dawn on March 27, 1836, and had them shot (see GOLIAD MASSACRE). "There was a great contrast in the feelings of the officers and the men," Portilla recorded. "Silence prevailed." The Goliad commander expressed his anguish and horror at becoming a public executioner in a letter to Urrea, who received the message at Victoria on March 27 between nine and ten in the morning, after the executions had been carried out.

After the Goliad episode Portilla's brother, Manuel, who was serving with Santa Anna's army, was among those captured at the battle of San Jacinto. José Portilla was sent by Urrea to the detachment under the command of Vicente Filisola, and he participated in the retreat of the Mexican army after San Jacinto. He remained in the Mexican army after the Texas Revolution and participated in the Mexican War. His military career again became controversial when, as brigadier general, a rank he achieved in 1856, he sided with French intervention in Mexico. The emperor Maximilian named him ministro de guerra y marina in 1867. Although Portilla was expelled after the fall of the French empire, he returned to Mexico. He died in Mexico City in 1873. Portilla's role in the Goliad Massacre is a controversial aspect of the Texas Revolution. His contemporary and countryman José Enrique de la Peña denounced him as "a blind and willing servant" who wished to "have his zeal recognized." Santa Anna hypocritically proclaimed that Portilla "is responsible for the cruel and inhumane manner of carrying out the execution to the nation, to the world, and to God." Such scholars as the noted historian Hubert H. Bancroft have assigned the official blame to Santa Anna, noting Urrea's recommendations of mercy and Portilla's hesitation and his sparing of Miller's men. Also, Santa Anna hardly kept secret the authority Congress granted him in December 1835 after José Antonio Mexía's Tampico expedition, allowing him to execute prisoners on the spot on grounds of piracy.
Burr H. Duval, commander of the Kentucky Mustangs under James W. Fannin, Jr., at Goliad, was born in Nelson County, Kentucky, in 1809, the son of Nancy (Hynes) and William Pope Duval. He was educated at St. Joseph's College in Bardstown, Kentucky, and was one of three brothers who aided the Texas struggle for independence from Mexico. He was elected captain of the company of Kentucky Riflemen that formed at Bardstown in November 1835. The group, which included Duval's brother, John Crittenden Duval, marched to Louisville, traveled by steamer to New Orleans, and on December 28, 1835, landed at Quintana, Texas, Velasco's rival town at the mouth of the Brazos River. The company reported to the provisional government two days later, when Duval requested that they be mustered as mounted rangers. The men served briefly, as John C. Duval recorded, as "a kind of marine corps" aboard the Texan vessel Invincible while it searched in vain for the Mexican privateer Bravo before returning to Quintana. About the middle of January 1836 the company sailed to Copano, then a principal Texas port on Aransas Bay, and marched to Refugio and then to Goliad, where the men became part of Fannin's Provisional Regiment of Volunteers. Fannin merged Duval's Kentucky Riflemen with Benjamin L. Lawrence's Tennessee volunteers and put Duval in command of the new company called the Kentucky Mustangs. This unit, along with Ira Westover's regulars, David N. Burke's Mobile Grays, Samuel Overton Pettus's San Antonio Greys, Benjamin F. Bradford's Alabama Greys, Amon B. King's Kentucky Volunteers, and Jack Shackelford's Red Rovers, formed the LaFayette Battalion, commanded by Benjamin C. Wallace.

In a letter to his father dated March 9, 1836, Duval wrote that, unlike himself, Fannin "is unpopular" and that only "the certainty of hard fighting, and that
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shortly, could have kept us together so long." He also wrote of his comrades that "no man ever thinks of retreat, or surrender, they must be exterminated to be whipped." During Fannin's attempted withdrawal from Goliad to Victoria on March 19 Duval joined Shackelford and Westover in protesting their commander's decision to rest the men and oxen on the open prairie before reaching the safety of the trees along Coleto Creek. In the ensuing battle of Coleto Duval's Mustangs were deployed along the rear of Fannin's square, which engaged the Mexican cavalry in close and bitter fighting. Duval was among the many wounded, but the square remained unbroken. After Fannin surrendered to José de Urrea, Duval was murdered with rest of Fannin's command in the Goliad Massacre, on March 27, 1836. His heirs received 3,840 acres of Texas land for his service and sacrifice. Duval County, established in 1858, was named for Burr H., John C., and Thomas H. Duval.
Francita Alavez, the "Angel of Goliad," accompanied Capt. Telesforo Alavez to Texas in March 1836. Her first name is variously given as Francita, Francisca, Panchita, or Pancheta, and her surname as Alavez, Álvarez, or Alevesco. Her real surname and place of birth are not known. Some writers claim that she was with Gen. José de Urrea's army at San Patricio, but this is highly unlikely since Captain Alavez came by ship from Matamoros to Copano Bay. Because Francita was with Captain Alavez in Texas, it was long assumed that she was his wife. However, research carried out in 1935 by Marjorie Rogers revealed that the army officer's legitimate wife was María Augustina de Pozo, who was abandoned by Alavez in 1834.

Francita was at Copano Bay when Maj. William P. Miller's Natchez volunteers were held prisoner there by General Urrea's troops. She noticed that the men were tightly bound with cords that restricted the circulation of blood in their arms. Taking pity on the men, she persuaded the Mexican soldiers to loosen their bonds and to give them food.
From Copano Bay she went with Alavez to Goliad and was there at the time of the Goliad Massacre. She is credited with persuading the officer in charge of the fortress not to execute Miller's men, who had been brought from Copano to Goliad. In addition, it is believed that Francita entered the fort the evening before the massacre and brought out several men and hid them, thereby saving their lives. Francita and Captain Alavez proceeded to Victoria, where she continued to aid the Texans held prisoner at Goliad by sending them messages and provisions. When the Mexicans retreated from Texas after Santa Anna's defeat at San Jacinto, Francita followed Captain Alavez to Matamoros, where she aided the Texans held prisoner there. From that town she was taken by Alavez to Mexico City and there abandoned. She returned to Matamoros penniless, but was befriended by Texans who had heard of her humanitarian acts on behalf of Texans captured by the Mexican army.

Dr. Joseph Barnard and Dr. Jack Shackelford, two of the Goliad prisoners spared by the Mexicans, later testified to Francita's saintly behavior, thus causing her deeds to be more widely known. She came to be called the Angel of Goliad and gained recognition as a heroine of the Texas Revolution.

The “Angel of Goliad” bust by Hugo Villa. Courtesy of Sarah Reveley.
Thomas Jefferson Rusk, soldier and statesman, the oldest of seven children of John and Mary (Sterritt) Rusk, was born in Pendleton District, South Carolina, on December 5, 1803. His father was an Irish stonemason immigrant. The family rented land from John C. Calhoun, who helped Rusk secure a position in the office of the Pendleton County district clerk, where he could earn a living while studying law. After admission to the bar in 1825, Rusk began his law practice in Clarksville, Georgia. In 1827 he married Mary F. (Polly) Cleveland, the daughter of Gen. Benjamin Cleveland. Rusk became a business partner of his father-in-law after he and Polly married. He lived in the gold region of Georgia and made sizable mining investments. In 1834, however, the managers of the company in which he had invested embezzled all the funds and fled to Texas. Rusk pursued them to Nacogdoches but never recovered the money. He did, however, decide to stay in Texas. He became a citizen of Mexico on February 11, 1835, applied for a headright in David G. Burnet’s colony, and sent for his family. After hearing Nacogdoches citizens denounce the despotism of Mexico, Rusk became involved in the independence movement. He organized volunteers from Nacogdoches and hastened to Gonzales, where his men joined Stephen F. Austin's army in preventing the Mexicans from seizing their cannon. They proceeded to San Antonio, but Rusk left the army before the siege.
of Bexar. The **provisional government** named him inspector general of the army in the Nacogdoches District, a position he filled from December 14, 1835, to February 26, 1836. As a delegate from Nacogdoches to the **Convention of 1836**, Rusk not only signed the **Texas Declaration of Independence** but also chaired the committee to revise the constitution. The **ad interim government**, installed on March 17, 1836, appointed Rusk secretary of war.

When informed that the Alamo had fallen and the Mexicans were moving eastward, Rusk helped President Burnet to move the government to Harrisburg. Rusk ordered all the coastal communities to organize militias. After the Mexicans massacred James W. Fannin's army (**see GOLIAD MASSACRE**) Burnet sent Rusk with orders for Gen. Sam Houston to make a stand against the enemy, and upon learning that Antonio López de Santa Anna intended to capture the government at Harrisburg the Texas army marched to Buffalo Bayou. As a security measure, Houston and Rusk remained silent about their plans. Rusk participated with bravery in the defeat of Santa Anna on April 21, 1836, in the **battle of San Jacinto**. From May 4 to October 31, 1836, he served as commander in chief of the **Army of the Republic of Texas**, with the rank of brigadier general. He followed the Mexican troops westward as they retired from Texas to be certain of their retreat beyond the Rio Grande. Then he conducted a military funeral for the troops massacred at Goliad. When it appeared that the Mexicans intended to attack Texas from Matamoros, Rusk called for more troops. Though he had 2,500 soldiers by July, he maintained a defensive position.

In the first regularly elected administration, President Houston appointed Rusk secretary of war, but after a few weeks he resigned to take care of pressing domestic problems. At the insistence of friends, however, he represented Nacogdoches in the Second Congress of the republic, from September 25, 1837, to May 24, 1838. While in the capital, Houston, he taught a Christian Sunday school class. Like many prominent Texans, Rusk became a Mason (**see FREEMASONRY**). He joined Milam Lodge No. 40 in Nacogdoches in 1837 and was a founding member of the Grand Lodge of Texas, organized in
Houston on December 20, 1837. In the election of 1838 and in succeeding ones, friends importuned Rusk to be a presidential candidate, but he refused. As chairman of the House Military Committee in 1837, he sponsored a militia bill that passed over Houston's veto, and Congress elected Rusk major general of the militia. In the summer of 1838 he commanded the Nacogdoches militia, which suppressed the Córdova Rebellion. Rusk suspected Cherokee involvement in the rebellion, but Chief Bowl emphatically denied any collusion with Córdova. In October, when Mexican agents were discovered among the Kickapoo Indians, Rusk defeated those Indians and their Indian allies. He captured marauding Caddo Indians in November 1838, and he risked an international incident when he invaded United States territory to return them to the Indian agent in Shreveport. Unrest among the Cherokees grew after the failure to ratify the Cherokee Treaty of 1836, which would have given the Cherokees title to the lands they occupied in East Texas. In July 1839 the final battle with the Cherokees and their allies was fought (see Cherookee War). Papers taken from captured Mexican agents implicated the Cherokees in a Mexican-Indian conspiracy against the Republic of Texas. Because he agreed with President Mirabeau B. Lamar's determination to remove the Cherokees, Rusk commanded part of the troops in the battle of the Neches, in which the Cherokees were driven into Oklahoma.

On December 12, 1838, Congress elected Rusk chief justice of the Supreme Court. He recognized that he was working in a system that combined Spanish and English law and practices, systems that did not always coincide. In Milam County v. Bell he established the rule of mandamus against public officers. He served until June 30, 1840, when he resigned to resume his law practice. Later he headed the bar of the Republic of Texas. He and J. Pinckney Henderson, later the first governor of the state of Texas, formed a law partnership on February 25, 1841, the most famous law firm in Texas of that day. For a short time the firm also included Kenneth L. Anderson, later vice president under Anson Jones. One of the most widely known cases Rusk handled was the murder of Robert Potter, former secretary of the Texas Navy, in 1842. Rusk represented the ten defendants, secured their bail, which had previously been denied, and obtained a
dismissal before the case was to be tried on May 6, 1843. Earlier in 1843 Rusk had been called once again to serve as a military commander. Concern over the lack of protection on the frontier caused Congress, in a joint ballot on January 16, 1843, to elect Rusk major general of the militia of the Republic of Texas. But he resigned in June when Houston obstructed his plans for aggressive warfare against Mexico. Rusk then turned his energies to establishing Nacogdoches University. He was vice president of the university when the charter was granted in 1845 and president in 1846.

The annexation of Texas by the United States was heartily supported by Rusk. He was president of the Convention of 1845, which accepted the annexation terms. Rusk's legal knowledge contributed significantly to the constitution of the new state. The first state legislature elected him and Houston to the United States Senate in February 1846 (see SENATORS). Rusk received the larger number of votes and the longer term of office. The two men forgot past differences as they worked to settle the southwest boundary question in favor of the Texas claim to the Rio Grande (see BOUNDARIES). Rusk supported the position of President James K. Polk on the necessity of the Mexican War and the acquisition of California. In the debate over the Compromise of 1850, Rusk refused to endorse secession, proposed by some in the caucus of southern congressmen. He vigorously defended Texas claims to New Mexico and argued forcefully for just financial compensation for both the loss of revenue from import duties as well as the loss of territory. As chairman of the Committee of Post Offices and Post Roads, he sponsored bills that improved services and lowered postage rates. As an early advocate of a transcontinental railroad through Texas, he made speeches in the Senate and throughout Texas in support of a southern route and toured Texas in 1853 to investigate a possible route. The Gadsden Treaty received his support since it provided an easier railroad route to the Pacific. Rusk received the approval of the state legislature for his vote in favor of the Kansas-Nebraska Act. He was a popular man in his party and was encouraged to become a presidential candidate in 1856. President James Buchanan offered him the position of postmaster general in 1857. During the special session of March 1857 the United States Senate elected him president pro tem. While Rusk attended the
spring session of Congress, Mrs. Rusk succumbed to tuberculosis, on April 23, 1856. Five of their seven children were still living at the time. Despondent over the death of his wife and ill from a tumor at the base of his neck, Rusk committed suicide on July 29, 1857. The State of Texas placed a monument at the graves of Rusk and his wife in Oak Grove Cemetery, Nacogdoches. Rusk County and the town of Rusk were named in his honor.
Vicente Filisola, military officer, was born in Ravello, Italy, in 1789 and went to Spain quite early, presumably with his family. He joined the Spanish army on March 17, 1804, and was in the military for the rest of his life. Because of his dedication, six years later he became a second lieutenant. He went to Mexico or New Spain in 1811, the year after Miguel Hidalgo y Costilla's proclamation of independence in the famous "Grito de Dolores" of September 16, 1810. Filisola, a loyalist devoted to the Spanish cause, was made captain of artillery in 1813 and the next year captain of grenadiers. He won the confidence and friendship of Agustín de Iturbide, and through this association became a leading military figure in Mexico. Supportive of Iturbide in his Plan de Iguala and his declaration as emperor of Mexico, and in command of the Trigarante ("Three Guarantees") army, Filisola was promoted to brigadier general and ordered to Central America to bring that region into Iturbide's empire. Filisola gained control of Central America only to have to relinquish it once Iturbide fell from power.

Despite his support of Iturbide, Filisola held a number of important posts in the Republic of Mexico during the 1820s, and in January 1833 he was named commander of the Eastern Provincias Internas. Because of a desperate illness
he relinquished his command for a time, but was later able to resume his duties. As a minor empresario, Filisola, on October 12, 1831, received a grant to settle in Texas 600 families who were not Anglo-Americans. The area of his grant in East Texas included part of the land granted to the Cherokee Indians in 1823. Filisola failed to fulfill his contract with the government. When Antonio López de Santa Anna organized his campaign against Texas, he commissioned Filisola as second in command of his army. Thus, with the capture of Santa Anna at the battle of San Jacinto, he was faced with the formidable task of withdrawing the Mexican forces from Texas. Despite considerable opposition from other officers, Filisola carried out Santa Anna's orders and began to retreat. By the time he received instructions from the Mexican government on May 28, he had already ordered the evacuation of San Antonio and had ratified the public treaty of Velasco, and his army had crossed the Nueces. Upon receiving the government's order to preserve conquests already made, he offered to countermarch, but because of the condition of the Mexican troops the retreat continued to Matamoros. On June 12, José de Urrea replaced Filisola in general command; Filisola resigned his own command to Juan José Andrade and retired to Saltillo. Filisola was accused of being a coward and a traitor in overseeing the withdrawal of the Mexican troops, and he faced formal charges upon his return to Mexico. The general successfully defended himself before the court-martial and was exonerated in June 1841. Upon his return to Mexico in 1836, Filisola published a defense of his conduct in Texas. It was translated into English and published by the Republic of Texas in 1837. During the Mexican War Filisola commanded one of three divisions of the Mexican army. In 1928 Carlos E. Castañeda published a translation of Filisola's account in The Mexican
Side of the Texas Revolution. Filisola's most complete account of the Texas Revolution is his Memoirs for the History of the War in Texas, which was not published in English translation until 1985. Filisola died on July 23, 1850, in Mexico City during a cholera epidemic.
After his election to the presidency of Mexico in 1833, **Antonio López de Santa Anna** left the inauguration of the new liberal policy to the vice president, **Valentín Gómez Farías**, went into political retirement for a few months, and emerged as leader of the reaction. He assumed dictatorial powers, dissolving state and national legislatures. Insurrections broke out at various points; Zacatecas, Coahuila, and Texas refused to accept centralism, holding to the **Constitution of 1824**. In New Orleans a movement, led by George Fisher and **José Antonio Mexía**, began at Bank's Arcade on October 13, 1835; the members of the movement raised men and money for an expedition to attack Tampico in an effort to stir up an insurrection in the eastern states of Mexico. Mexía, who was to lead the expedition, communicated the plan to the Texas leaders who approved it, although some, **Stephen F. Austin** among them, advocated an attack on Matamoros instead. Counting on the support of the liberals known to be among the members of the garrison at Tampico, Mexía and his 150 "efficient emigrants" left New Orleans on November 6, 1835, on the schooner **Mary Jane**. The schooner ran...
aground off the bar of Tampico on November 14. This disaster, together with a premature uprising of the garrison on November 13 and the arrival of fresh troops from Tuxpan, upset Mexía's plans; he attacked the city held by Gregorio Gómez on November 15, was defeated, withdrew on the American schooner Halcyon, and embarked for the mouth of the Brazos River, where he landed his troops on December 3. Thirty-one prisoners were left at Tampico; of these, three died of wounds; the others were tried by court martial and shot on December 14.
The battle of San Patricio was an outgrowth of the **Matamoros expedition of 1835–36**. Shortly after the defeat of Gen. **Martín Perfecto de Cos** at the Alamo there was a clamor among newly arrived volunteers from the United States to mount a campaign to strike a crippling blow on the Mexican army in their homeland. This tied in with crosscurrents of a revolt against **Antonio López de Santa Anna** in Mexico. Liberal forces at the **Consultation**, who were aligned with Mexican liberals, somehow managed to send **Stephen F. Austin** to the United States as a commissioner and deprive Gen. **Sam Houston** of power by appointing Col. **James W. Fannin, Jr.**, as the **General Council**'s agent, with similar powers given to Houston.

Simplified, the problem facing the new Texas government was one of supply. Houston proposed to concentrate forces at port El Cópano in order to be able to control supplies to Texas and also to withhold them from any Mexican army. The picture was further clouded by Dr. James Grant and Col. **Francis W. Johnson**, who set up an independent Matamoros expedition under their private control, with the approval of the Council. After raiding supply warehouses in San Antonio,
Grant moved to Goliad and took horses and other supplies from Philip Dimmitt's command. Houston spoke to assembled troops in Refugio and convinced some of the men under Johnson and Grant that the Matamoros expedition was folly. Johnson and Grant took the remaining men, estimated at from sixty to 100 by historians, to San Patricio. Grant learned that Capt. Nicolás Rodríguez was in the area with a few men. He surprised them and took the prisoners and their horses to San Patricio, where in a few days the prisoners escaped. In order to get more horses the Texans went all the way to the Santa Rosa Ranch (near the site of present-day Raymondville). Johnson took the horses and returned to San Patricio while Grant sought additional horses. Upon his return Johnson sent horses to the ranch of Julián de la Garza about four miles south of San Patricio. The men divided up, with Captain Pearson and eight men camping on the public square and the rest in three different houses. Gen. José de Urrea, through a network of spies, had kept track of the Johnson-Grant forces and had left Matamoros with about 400 men. Upon learning that Johnson was camped at San Patricio, he put his men through a forced march during a bitterly cold, wet night and arrived at San Patricio at 3:00 A.M. on February 27. His first action was to send thirty men under Capt. Rafael Pretala to the ranch where the horses had been taken. In the attack four men were killed and eight taken prisoner. In San Patricio Urrea reported sixteen killed and twenty-four taken prisoner. Johnson and four men quartered with him managed to escape and made their way back to Goliad. Legend tells the story that Urrea sent word ahead to loyalists to leave a light burning in their homes and they would not be molested. It so happened that
Johnson was working late-with a light. Of the thirty-four Texans at San Patricio eight were killed, thirteen taken prisoner, and six escaped. At least seven of them were Mexicans. Possibly two other Texans, whose names have not been uncovered, were also killed. Urrea reported that "the town and the rest of the inhabitants did not suffer the least damage." McGloin reported that those killed were "interred next day by the Rev. T. J. Malloy in the church yard of the same place." Legend also tells that the dead were buried in the Old Cemetery on the Hill. On March 2 Urrea's men ambushed Grant's men near a creek crossing at Agua Dulce; all except six were killed or captured. Grant was killed. Urrea remained camped somewhere in the vicinity of San Patricio until March 12, when he took some of the cattle, arms, and ammunition that Grant and Johnson had gathered.
The battle of Agua Dulce Creek, an engagement of the Texas Revolution and an aftermath of the controversial Matamoros expedition of 1835–36, occurred twenty-six miles below San Patricio on March 2, 1836. Dr. James Grant and his party of twenty-three Americans and three Mexicans were surprised and defeated by a Mexican force under José de Urrea. Six of the volunteers escaped, five of whom joined James W. Fannin, Jr., at Goliad and were killed in the Goliad Massacre on March 27; six were captured and taken to Matamoros as prisoners; all others were killed in the engagement.
The series of fights that together make up the battle of Refugio occurred between March 12 and 15, 1836, during the Texas Revolution, at Nuestra Señora del Refugio Mission in Refugio County. In early March 1836 Carlos de la Garza and about eighty rancheros, serving as scouts and advance cavalry for Mexican general José de Urrea's invading army, raided the village of Refugio. On March 10, during the Goliad campaign of 1836, James W. Fannin, Jr., sent Amon B. King and twenty-eight men to Refugio to help the families besieged there escape to Goliad, knowing that their destination lay in the path by which the main Mexican force under Urrea was expected daily. On March 12, before leaving Refugio, King stubbornly sought to punish Garza and his rancheros. He underestimated Garza's strength and resolve, however, and was forced to retreat with the families back to the mission, where he took refuge and sent word to Fannin at Goliad for help. In what proved to be a disastrous move, Fannin dispatched Lt. Col. William Ward and the Georgia Battalion, together with some of Peyton S. Wyatt's men, to relieve King's command. Ward and some 120 men successfully allayed the siege in the afternoon of March 13. Nevertheless, as John J. Linn wrote, "A difference of opinion arose between the two commanders in
relation to the command, which seemed to be irreconcilable, as they could not be coerced into a concert of action, even by the perils that threatened them both so imminently."

With both commanders quarreling over rank yet anxious for a fight, the Texian force divided. Some of Ward's men went with King on a punitive mission against the rancheros, and while they were out Urrea and the main force of 1,500 men surrounded Ward's party at the mission. When King attempted to return to the mission, he came upon the rear of Urrea's army and was forced to make a stand in the timber on the Mission River within site of Ward's command. The troops held their ground valiantly from late morning to dark, March 14, while Ward withstood several vigorous assaults. Mexican losses were heavy; the Texans suffered few casualties but were short of food, water, and ammunition. Ward sent James Humphries to Goliad to advise Fannin, who finally got word to Ward through Edward Perry to retreat to Victoria, where they were to rendezvous. Volunteers were left with the wounded and families, and Ward apparently left the mission with the remainder of his battalion on the night of March 14 and traveled in the direction of Copano through woods and swamps to avoid the Mexican cavalry. King's company also tried to escape during the night but was overtaken on March 15 and marched back as prisoners to the mission, now occupied by Urrea's forces. The next day those remaining from Ward's battalion, together with King and all of his company, were executed, except for two Germans and Lewis T. Ayers, who were spared with the local families by the German-born Lt. Col. Juan José Holzinger. Ward's men managed to reach Victoria, but finding the village occupied by Urrea's troops, continued their retreat to Dimitt's Landing, where they surrendered to Urrea. Except for those detailed as laborers to build boats at Victoria, they were marched back to La Bahía, where they were executed in the Goliad Massacre with Fannin's men on March 27, 1836. Though the battle of Refugio is one of the less-known engagements of the Texas Revolution, its consequences are significant. Fannin disastrously split his forces by ordering King and Ward into the path of Urrea's army, a move that reduced by about 150 the number of men he was able to bring to bear against the Mexicans at the battle of Coleto. King and Ward, whose quarrel over rank divided their own small force, refused to return to Goliad.
before engaging Mexican troops. This prevented their rejoining Fannin, thereby delaying Fannin's retreat to Victoria—a delay that contributed to his defeat at the Coleto and resulted as well in the Texas misfortune in the battle of Refugio and the execution of King's men. Most historians have judged the entire episode as folly. The clash of stubborn personalities, together with their contempt for the prowess of the Mexican army, reduced Fannin's, Ward's, and King's effectiveness, contributing to their defeat and to the calamity of the Goliad Massacre.
The battle of Coleto, the culmination of the **Goliad Campaign of 1836**, occurred near Coleto Creek in Goliad County on March 19 and 20, 1836. Originally called "the battle of the prairie" and "la batalla del encinal [oak grove] del Perdido [Creek]," it was one of the most significant engagements of the **Texas Revolution**. The battle, however, cannot properly be considered as isolated from the series of errors and misfortunes that preceded it, errors for which the Texas commander, **James W. Fannin, Jr.**, was ultimately responsible. The most exasperating decision confronting Fannin was whether to abandon Goliad after having fortified it, and if so, when. He had already been informed of Gen. **José de Urrea**'s advancing Mexican army by **Plácido Benavides**, after the defeat of Texas forces under **Francis W. Johnson** and **James Grant** at the **battles of San Patricio** and Creek **Agua Dulce**. The Mexican advance caused the Texans to abandon the port of Copano, thus making Goliad considerably less important strategically, as Fannin knew. He had received word that the Alamo had fallen as well. Still, he continued to fortify Fort Defiance, as he christened the **La Bahía** presidio, and awaited orders from superiors to abandon the site, knowing also that a retreat would not be well received among his men, who were eager to confront the Mexicans.

More immediately consequential to the battle of Coleto was Fannin's dispatching **Amon B. King**'s men and then **William Ward** and the **Georgia Battalion** to Refugio, a move primarily induced by the activities of **Carlos de la Garza** and his rancheros, who were operating as advance cavalry for General Urrea. Not only did the decision to send Ward and King into Urrea's known path
dangerously divide the Goliad garrison, thus reducing by about 150 the men Fannin would be able to bring against Urrea at Coleto Creek, but the move became the main reason Fannin waited so long to abandon Goliad. He refused to do so until he learned of King and Ward's fate, even after he received Sam Houston's order to fall back to Victoria. Since King had taken the Goliad garrison's wagons and teams with him to Refugio, however, Fannin delayed his retreat further, awaiting the arrival of Albert C. Horton's men from Guadalupe Victoria, who were bringing needed carts and twenty yokes of oxen garnered by army quartermaster John J. Linn. Accounts are not in agreement, but Horton apparently arrived by March 16. In addition, by capturing virtually all of Fannin's couriers sent to find King and Ward, Urrea learned the details of the Goliad commander's plans and schemed accordingly. Fannin, however, was unable to find out his opponent's true strength or position, though on March 17 Horton's cavalry did discover Col. Juan Morales approaching with the Jiménez and San Luis battalions, 500 veterans of the battle of the Alamo whom Antonio López de Santa Anna had sent from Bexar to reinforce Urrea.

Fannin finally learned of King and Ward's defeat in the battle of Refugio from Hugh McDonald Frazer on March 17, but he still did not order the retreat to Victoria until the next day. March 18 was spent instead in a series of skirmishes between Horton's cavalry and Urrea's advance forces, which by then had reached Goliad. Fannin, thinking the fort was about to be besieged, kept the garrison on alert and attempted no retreat even that night, the result of a council decision based on Horton's observations. During this delay the oxen, which were to be hitched to the carts made ready for the removal to Victoria, were left unfed.

At last the Texans began their retreat, by 9:00 A.M. on March 19 under a heavy fog. Fannin insisted on taking nine cumbersome artillery pieces of various calibers and about 1,000 muskets, though he neglected to take enough water and food for more than a few meals. The carts were heavily loaded, the hungry oxen were tired and unruly, and progress was slow. Urrea, expecting to lay siege to the fort, was unaware of Fannin's departure until 11:00 A.M. But the Texans forfeited about an hour of their lead while crossing the San Antonio River; a cart broke down, and the largest cannon fell into the river and had to be fished out.
Another valuable hour was lost when Fannin ordered the oxen detached for grazing after the column had proceeded about a mile past Manahuilla Creek. Jack Shackelford, Burr H. Duval, and Ira Westover protested this stop, arguing that the column should not rest until reaching the protection of the Coleto Creek timber. Shackelford particularly noted his commander's contempt for the Mexican army's prowess and his disbelief that Urrea would dare follow them—an assumption apparently common among Fannin's men.

Urrea had quickly left Goliad without his artillery and the full complement of his force in order to narrow Fannin's two-hour lead. Mexican sources indicate that he set out with eighty cavalrymen and 360 infantrymen. He discovered through his mounted scouts the location of Fannin's column and that the rebel force was considerably smaller than supposed, information that prompted him to return 100 infantrymen to Goliad to help secure Presidio La Bahía and escort the artillery ordered to join him as soon as possible. Horton's approximately thirty cavalrymen served as advance guards on all sides of Fannin's column. The unalert rear guard, however, which included Hermann Ehrenberg, failed to detect the Mexican cavalry. Meanwhile, the Texans had scarcely resumed march after resting the oxen before another cart broke down; its contents had to be transferred to another wagon. Fannin then sent Horton to scout the Coleto Creek timber, now in sight, when the Mexican cavalry emerged from behind them. Upon overtaking the lumbering Texan position at about 1:30 P.M., the Mexican commander ordered his cavalry to halt Fannin's advance toward the protective timber. Fannin set up a skirmish line with artillery while the column attempted to reach Coleto Creek, about two miles distant.

Perceiving the danger, he then formed his men into a moving square and continued toward the closer timber of Perdido Creek, which was less than a mile away when the Texans were overtaken by Mexican cavalry. Caught in a valley some six feet below its surroundings, the Texans were trying to get to the more defensible higher ground about 400 to 500 yards distant, when their ammunition cart broke down. While Fannin called a council to determine the feasibility of
taking what ammunition they could and reaching the timber, Urrea, seeing his advantage, attacked.

With little water, and situated in an open prairie covered with high grass that occluded vision of their enemy, Fannin's men made ready their defense. Their hollow square was three ranks deep. Each man received three or four muskets. Bayonets, rifles, more than forty pairs of pistols, and abundant ammunition complemented this arsenal. The San Antonio Greys and Red Rovers formed the
front line; Duval's Mustangs and others, including Frazer's Refugio militia, formed the rear. The left flank was defended by Westover's regulars, the right by the Mobile Grays. The artillery was placed in the corners (except when moved as needed), and Fannin assumed a command position in the rear of the right flank. In addition, an outpost of sharpshooters formed around Abel Morgan's hospital wagon, which had become immobilized earlier when an ox was hit by Mexican fire.

Soon after Urrea's cavalry managed to stop Fannin's retreat, the Mexican general amassed his troops and attacked the square. The rifle companies under Morales assaulted the left, the grenadiers and part of the San Luis Battalion charged the right under Urrea's direct supervision, the Jiménez Battalion under Col. Mariano Salas attacked the front, and Col. Gabriel Núñez's cavalry charged the rear.

Sources differ widely about the numbers of men involved on March 19.

Fannin defended his position with about 300 men. Urrea wrote that he had eighty cavalry and 260 infantry at the time the Texans were overtaken, a figure confirmed by Peña, who also stressed that most of the Mexican troops were Alamo veterans. Many Texas sources give unrealistically high numbers for Urrea's pursuit force. Clearly the Mexican general set out with only a small force of veteran troops to ensure catching Fannin, and left orders for a larger force, including artillery, to follow and aid in battling the Texans once they were caught. It seems likely that Urrea had between 300 and 500 men when he overtook Fannin, and after receiving reinforcements by morning, March 20, he had between 700 and 1,000.
The battle of Coleto lasted until after sunset on March 19. The Texans made effective use of their bayonets, multiple muskets, and nine cannons; their square remained unbroken. Dr. Joseph H. Barnard recorded that seven of his comrades had been killed and sixty wounded (forty severely), Fannin among them. The Mexican general was impressed with both the "withering fire of the enemy" and their ability to repulse his three charges. Ironically, Urrea retired because of ammunition depletion. His casualties were heavy as well, though accounts vary widely. He then positioned snipers in the tall grass around the square and inflicted additional casualties before Texan sharpshooters were able to quell these attacks by firing at the flashes illuminating the darkness. Ultimately, the Texans under Fannin suffered ten deaths on March 19.

Fannin's men hardly felt defeated and anxiously awaited Horton's return with reinforcements from Guadalupe Victoria. None came, however, for Horton was unable to cut through the Mexican lines. William Ward and the Georgia Battalion, defeated in the battle of Refugio, were close enough to hear the Coleto gunfire during their retreat to Victoria, but were exhausted and hungry. Urrea knew from captured couriers that Ward and Fannin would try to rendezvous at Victoria, so with the aid of Carlos de la Garza's men, he kept the Georgia Battalion isolated in the Guadalupe riverbottom until they surrendered. At the Coleto battlefield, Urrea posted detachments at three points around Fannin's square to prevent escape and kept the Texans on stiff watch throughout the night with false bugle calls.

Fannin's position became critical during the night because the lack of water and inability to light fires made treating the wounded impossible; the situation was made even more unbearable by a cold and rainy norther. The cries of the wounded demoralized everyone. The lack of water, which was required to cool
and clean the cannons during fire, also guaranteed that the artillery would be ineffective the next day, especially considering that the artillerists had sustained a high number of casualties. Furthermore, ammunition was low. A council among Fannin and his officers weighing these facts concluded that they could not sustain another battle. The proposition to escape to the Perdido or Coleto creek timber under dark and before Urrea received reinforcements was rejected, since after much debate the men unanimously voted not to abandon the wounded, among whom the unwounded all had friends or relatives. They therefore began digging trenches and erecting barricades of carts and dead animals in preparation for the next day's battle. By the time this was completed, the Mexican position had been reinforced with munitions, fresh troops, and two or three artillery pieces from Goliad. Urrea placed his artillery on the slopes overlooking the Texan position and grouped for battle at 6:15 A.M., March 20.

After the Mexican artillery had fired one or possibly two rounds, Fannin was convinced that making another stand would be futile. Another consultation among his officers produced the decision to seek honorable terms for surrender for the sake of the wounded, and to hope the Mexicans would adhere to them. Fannin's men apparently drafted terms of surrender guaranteeing that they would be considered prisoners of war, that their wounded would be treated, and that they sooner or later would be paroled to the United States. But Urrea could not ratify such an agreement; he was bound by Santa Anna's orders and congressional decree to accept no terms other than unconditional surrender. He made it clear to Fannin in person that he could offer only to intercede on the Texans' behalf with Santa Anna. The extant
Independence! Road to the Texas Revolution History Series.

Those Texans able to walk were escorted back to Goliad. Texas physicians were made to care for the Mexican wounded to the neglect of their own men. Many of the Texas wounded were not transported to Goliad for three days; Fannin himself was left on the field for two. Urrea, meanwhile, continued his advance to secure Guadalupe Victoria, from where he wrote Santa Anna recommending clemency for the Goliad prisoners. One week after Fannin's surrender, however, Santa Anna bypassed Urrea and ordered Col. José Nicolás de la Portilla, the commander at Goliad, to carry out the congressional decree of December 30, 1835, that captured armed rebels must be executed as pirates. Fannin's entire command, together with William Ward and the Georgia Battalion, were shot in the Goliad Massacre on Palm Sunday, March 27, 1836.

Although the battle of Coleto is usually considered meaningful only as a prologue to the massacre, it does have separate significance. The sequence of events underscores the tragedy of Fannin's inability to make timely decisions crucial for success. This disadvantage was worsened by his disrespect for the capabilities of his enemy and a reluctance, common in the Texas army, to coordinate campaigns. Urrea, by contrast, showed skill in staying alert to Fannin's plans, keeping the Texans inside the presidio an extra day, pursuing and catching them by taking advantage of every opportunity, and isolating Ward's men near Victoria while successfully battling Fannin's command at Coleto Creek. Still, the Texans, though most were relatively untrained volunteers, obeyed their commanders and
withstood the onslaught of seasoned enemy troops. The intensity of this battle produced heroism on both sides.

The battle's greatest significance, however, remains bound up in its consequences. Urrea's victory gained him greater esteem in the army but also incurred the jealousy of other generals, especially Santa Anna, who had only recently suffered through his difficult victory at the Alamo. Ironically, the triumph caused overconfidence among Mexican leaders, who, like Santa Anna, now believed the campaign against the rebellion to be nearing a successful conclusion. Finally, it was the Goliad Massacre and not the defeat and surrender at Coleto Creek that soured United States opinion against Mexico and gave Houston and the Texas army the second half of the rallying cry that inspired victory at the battle of San Jacinto: "Remember the Alamo! Remember Goliad!" The assumed location of the Coleto battlefield is now maintained as Fannin Battleground State Historic Site by the Texas Historical Commission and is near Fannin, Texas (once called Fanning's Defeat), on U.S. Highway 59 between Goliad and Victoria.
The Goliad Massacre, the tragic termination of the **Goliad Campaign of 1836**, is of all the episodes of the **Texas Revolution** the most infamous. Though not as salient as the **battle of the Alamo**, the massacre immeasurably garnered support for the cause against Mexico both within Texas and in the United States, thus contributing greatly to the Texan victory at the **battle of San Jacinto** and sustaining the independence of the Republic of Texas. The execution of **James W. Fannin, Jr.**'s command in the Goliad Massacre was not without precedent, however, and Mexican president and General **Antonio López de Santa Anna**, who ultimately ordered the exterminations, was operating within Mexican law. Therefore, the massacre cannot be considered isolated from the events and legislation preceding it.

As he prepared to subdue the Texas colonists Santa Anna was chiefly concerned with the help they expected from the United States. His solution was tested after November 15, 1835, when Gen. **José Antonio Mexía** attacked Tampico with three companies enlisted at New Orleans. One company, badly led, broke ranks at the beginning of Mexía's action, and half its number, together with wounded men from other companies, were captured by Santa Anna's forces the next day. Twenty-eight of them were tried as pirates, convicted, and, on December 14, 1835, shot (see **TAMPICO EXPEDITION**). Four weeks elapsed between their
capture and their execution, enabling Santa Anna to
gauge in advance the reaction of New Orleans to
their fate. It was, on the whole, that in shooting these
prisoners, Mexico was acting within its rights.
Believing that he had found an effective deterrent to
expected American help for Texas, Santa Anna
sought and obtained from the Mexican Congress the
decree of December 30, 1835, which directed that all
foreigners taken in arms against the government
should be treated as pirates and shot.
Santa Anna's main army took no prisoners; execution
of the murderous decree of December 30, 1835, fell
to Gen. José de Urrea, commander of Santa Anna's
right wing. The first prisoners taken by Urrea were
the survivors of Francis W. Johnson's party,
captured at and near San Patricio on February 27, 1836 (see SAN PATRICIO,
BATTLE OF). Urrea, according to his contemporary Reuben M. Potter, "was
not blood thirsty and when not overruled by orders of a superior, or stirred by
irritation, was disposed to treat prisoners with lenity." When the Mexican general
reported to Santa Anna that he was holding the San Patricio prisoners, Santa
Anna ordered Urrea to comply with the decree of December 30. Urrea complied
to the extent of issuing an order to shoot his prisoners, along with those
captured in the battle of Agua Dulce Creek, but he had no stomach for such
cold-blooded killing; and when Father Thomas J. Malloy, priest of the Irish
colonists, protested the execution, Urrea remitted the prisoners to Matamoros,
asking Santa Anna's pardon for having done so and washing his hands of their
fate.
At Refugio on March 15, 1836, Urrea was again confronted with the duty of
complying with the fatal decree of December 30. Thirty-three Americans were
captured in the course of the fighting at Nuestra Señora del Refugio Mission,
half of them with Capt. Amon B. King's company, the others "one by one"
King and his men had infuriated their enemies by burning local ranchos and shooting eight Mexicans seated around a campfire, and these enemies were clamoring for vengeance. Urrea satisfied his conscience by shooting King and fourteen of his men, while "setting at liberty all who were colonists or Mexicans."

A more difficult situation confronted him on March 20 after James W. Fannin's surrender. Fannin's men had agreed upon and reduced to writing the terms upon which they proposed to capitulate. The gist of these was that Fannin and his men, including his officers and the wounded, should be treated as prisoners of war according to the usages of civilized nations and, as soon as possible, paroled and returned to the United States. In view of Santa Anna's positive orders, Urrea could not, of course, accede to these terms, but refusing them would mean another bloody battle. Fannin's men possessed, besides their rifles, 500 spare muskets and nine brass cannons and, if told that it would mean death to surrender, could sell their lives at fearful cost and might cut their way through Urrea's lines. When the Mexican and Texan commissioners seeking surrender terms failed to agree, Urrea shortened the conference by dealing directly with Fannin and proposing written terms, under which the Texans should give up their arms and become prisoners of war "at the disposal of the Supreme Mexican Government." He assured Fannin that there was no known instance where a prisoner of war who had trusted to the clemency of the Mexican government had lost his life, that he would recommend to General Santa Anna acceptance of the terms proposed by Fannin's men, and that he was confident of obtaining Santa Anna's approval within a period of eight days. Fannin, who could not have done much else-Urrea had received reinforcements and artillery that would have devastated the Texan position in an open prairie on ground lower than the Mexican lines-accepted Urrea's proposals but did not inform his men of the conditional nature of these terms. On the other hand, Maj. Juan José Holsinger, one of the Mexican commissioners, lulled their suspicions by entering the Texan lines with the greeting, "Well, gentlemen! In eight days, home and liberty!"
Fannin's men delivered up their arms, and some 230 or 240 uninjured or slightly wounded men were marched back to Goliad and imprisoned in the chapel of Nuestra Señora de Loreto Presidio at La Bahía, the fort they had previously occupied (see FORT DEFIANCE). The wounded Texans, about fifty (some estimates are much higher) including doctors and orderlies, Colonel Fannin among them, were returned to Goliad over the next two days.

On March 22 William Ward, who with Amon B. King had been defeated in the battle of Refugio, surrendered near Dimitt's Landing on the terms accorded Fannin, and he and about eighty of his men of the Georgia Battalion were added to the Goliad prisoners on March 25. Urrea, in compliance with his promise, wrote to Santa Anna from Guadalupe Victoria, informing him that Fannin and his men were prisoners of war "at the disposal of the Supreme Mexican Government" and recommending clemency; but he reported nothing in his letter of the terms that Fannin and his men had drafted for their surrender.

Santa Anna replied to Urrea's clemency letter on March 23 by ordering immediate execution of these "perfidious foreigners" and repeated the order in a letter the next day. Meantime, on March 23, evidently doubting Urrea's willingness to serve as executioner, Santa Anna sent a direct order to the "Officer Commanding the Post of Goliad" to execute the prisoners in his hands. This order was received on March 26 by Col. José Nicolás de la Portilla, whom Urrea had left at Goliad. Two hours later Portilla received another order, this one from Urrea, "to treat the prisoners with consideration, and especially their leader, Fannin," and to employ
them in rebuilding the town. But when he wrote this seemingly humane order, Urrea well knew that Portilla would not be able to comply with it, for on March 25, after receiving Santa Anna's letter, Urrea had ordered reinforcements that would have resulted in too large a diminution of the garrison for the prisoners to be employed on public works.

Portilla suffered an unquiet night weighing these conflicting orders, but he concluded that he was bound to obey Santa Anna's order and directed that the prisoners be shot at dawn. At sunrise on Palm Sunday, March 27, 1836, the unwounded Texans were formed into three groups under heavy guard commanded by Capt. Pedro (Luis?) Balderas, Capt. Antonio Ramírez, and first adjutant Agustín Alcérrica (a colonel in the Tres Villas Battalion in April 1836). The largest group, including what remained of Ward's Georgia Battalion and Capt. Burr H. Duval's company, was marched toward the upper ford of the San Antonio River on the Bexar road. The San Antonio Grays, Mobile Grays, and others were marched along the Victoria road in the direction of the lower ford.

*March to the Massacre* by Andrew Jackson Houston. Courtesy of the San Jacinto Museum of History.
Capt. John Shackelford's **Red Rovers** and **Ira J. Westover**'s regulars were marched southwestwardly along the San Patricio road. The guard, which was to serve also as a firing squad, included the battalions of Tres Villas and Yucatán, dismounted cavalry, and pickets from the Cuautla, Tampico, and Durango regiments.

The prisoners held little suspicion of their fate, for they had been told a variety of stories—they were to gather wood, drive cattle, be marched to Matamoros, or proceed to the port of Copano for passage to New Orleans. Only the day before, Fannin himself, with his adjutant general, **Joseph M. Chadwick**, had returned from Copano, where, accompanied by Holsinger and other Mexican officers, they had tried to charter the vessel on which **William P. Miller**'s Nashville Battalion had arrived earlier (these men had been captured and imprisoned at Goliad, also). Although this was really an attempt by Urrea to commandeer the ship, the vessel had already departed. Still, Fannin became cheerful and reported to his men that the Mexicans were making arrangements for their departure. The troops sang "Home Sweet Home" on the night of March 26.

At selected spots on each of the three roads, from half to three-fourths of a mile from the presidio, the three groups were halted. The guard on the right of the column of prisoners then countermarched and formed with the guard on the left. At a prearranged moment, or upon a given signal, the guards fired upon the prisoners at a range too close to miss. Nearly all were killed at the first fire. Those not killed were pursued and slaughtered by gunfire, bayonet, or lance. Fannin and some forty (Peña estimated eighty or ninety)
wounded Texans unable to march were put to death within the presidio under the direction of Capt. Carolino Huerta of the Tres Villas battalion.

From two groups shot on the river roads, those not instantly killed fled to the woods along the stream, and twenty-four managed to escape. The third group, on the San Patricio road, was farther from cover; only four men from it are known to have escaped. A man-by-man study of Fannin's command indicates that 342 were executed at Goliad on March 27. Only twenty-eight escaped the firing squads, and twenty more were spared as physicians, orderlies, interpreters, or mechanics largely because of the entreaties of a "high bred beauty" whom the Texans called the "Angel of Goliad" (see ALAVEZ, FRANCITA), and the brave and kindly intervention of Col. Francisco Garay. Many of those who eventually escaped were first recaptured and later managed a second escape. Two physicians, Joseph H. Barnard and John Shackelford, were taken to San Antonio to treat Mexican wounded from the battle of the Alamo; they later escaped.

Portilla wrote that the total number of his prisoners was 445, exclusive of William P. Miller's eighty men, who had been captured without arms at Copano and were thus to be spared. Texan sources specify the number of prisoners as 407, exclusive of Miller's men. This may have been correct. Some of the prisoners taken at Refugio but not executed with King's men are known to have been at Goliad, where they were again spared because they were serving the Mexican army as blacksmiths, wheelwrights, or other artisans. The exact fate of others captured at Refugio is not known. They may have been added to the
prisoners at Goliad and killed with Fannin on March 27. Urrea detained about twenty of Ward's men to build boats at Guadalupe Victoria, and Señora Alavez intervened with her husband, Col. Telesforo Alavez, whom Urrea left in charge of this village, to spare their lives as well; they afterward escaped. About a week after the Goliad killings, Santa Anna ordered the execution of Miller and his men and the others who had been spared at Goliad, but he rescinded the order the next day. The men were marched instead to Matamoros after the battle of San Jacinto. Though some managed to escape en route, most remained there until the Mexican government later released them.

After the executions the bodies were burned, the remains left exposed to weather, vultures, and coyotes, until June 3, 1836, when Gen. Thomas J. Rusk, who had established his headquarters at Victoria after San Jacinto and was passing through Goliad in pursuit of Gen. Vicente Filisola's retreating army, gathered the remains and buried them with military honors. Some of the survivors attended the ceremony.
The common grave remained unmarked until about 1858, when a Goliad merchant, George von Dohlen, placed a pile of rocks on what was believed to be the site. In April 1885 a memorial was finally erected, in the city of Goliad rather than on the site, by the Fannin Monument Association, formed by William L. Hunter, a massacre survivor. In 1930 some Goliad Boy Scouts found charred bone fragments that had been unearthed over the years by animals, and an excursion to the site by Goliad residents on New Year's Day, 1932, succeeded in attracting an investigation of the site by University of Texas anthropologist J. E. Pearce. The authenticity of the gravesite was further verified by historians Clarence R. Wharton and Harbert Davenport. In 1936, in celebration of the Texas Centennial, money was appropriated to build a massive pink granite monument, dedicated on June 4, 1938. Davenport presented the address, which was published as "The Men of Goliad" in the Southwestern Historical Quarterly (1939).
The impact of the Goliad Massacre was crucial. Until this episode Santa Anna's reputation had been that of a cunning and crafty man, rather than a cruel one. When the Goliad prisoners were taken, Texas had no other army in the field (see REVOLUTIONARY ARMY), and the newly constituted ad interim government seemed incapable of forming one. The Texas cause was dependent on the material aid and sympathy of the United States. Had Fannin's and Miller's men been dumped on the wharves at New Orleans penniless, homesick, humiliated, and distressed, and each with his separate tale of Texas mismanagement and incompetence, Texas prestige in the United States would most likely have fallen, along with sources of help. But Portilla's volleys at Goliad, together with the fall of the Alamo, branded both Santa Anna and the Mexican people with a reputation for cruelty and aroused the fury of the people of Texas, the United States, and even Great Britain and France, thus considerably promoting the success of the Texas Revolution.
SOUTHWESTERN HISTORICAL QUARTERLY

19. Abel Morgan and His Account of the Battle of Goliad
   by Joseph Milton Nance

20. John Crittenden Duval: The Last Survivor of the Goliad Massacre
    by William Corner

21. The Men of Goliad: Dedicatory Address at the unveiling of the Monument erected by the Texas Centennial Commission at the Grave of Fannin’s Men
    by Harbert Davenport